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CHAPTER I 
THE COLONIAL YEARS 
vmen you mentioned the affair of the Land Yesterday, you 
went back to the old Times and told us you had been in 
Possession of the Province of Maryland above One hundred 
Years, but what is One hundred in comparison to the length 
of Time since our Claim began? Since we came out of thi s 
Ground? The lands belonged to Us long before you knew 
anything of them.I 
Canastego, Indian Chieftain at 
the Treaty of Lancaster, 1744 
So long as there was a frontier for Americans to settle, there was 
~ concomitant Indian problem to be faced. The experience of dealing with 
the Indians occupied significant portions of official colonial life; co~, 
lonial documents are full of references to the red men and ceremonial 
speeches to and from them. One scholar has even suggested that the 
Indian treaty is an independent form of literature, the colonial period' s 
only contribution to letters.£ The Engli sh Crown left handling of Indian 
affairs very much to the individual colonies duri ng the first one hundred 
and fifty years of the colonial experience. vmile her colonies remained 
scattered outposts on the wilderness of the Atlantic coast, the diplomacy 
of the forest was considered a local matter. Early colonists were not 
always _successful in this venture, and the Virginia massacres of 1622 j 
the Pequot War of 1637 and the Yemassee War of 1715 witness that resort 
lpau.l A. W. Wallace, Conrad Weiser (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1945), 191. 
2Lawrence Wroth, "The Indian Treaty as Literature,"~ Review, 
XVII (Ju.ly, 1928), 749-766. 
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to arms was not an infrequent lubricant for friction between the two 
peoples. 
As the colonies grew, more sophisticated methods were necessary. A 
symbiotic relation took form wh~rein the Indians provided furs that the 
colonists avidly desired for trade with Europe and the colonists provided 
the guns, powder and clothing upon which the red men had become dependent. 
This trade was a most important aspect of colonial economy, and caused 
provincial officials to interest themselves in effective Indian manage-
ment. Each colony still managed its own affairs, but three were parti-
cularly important because of the tribes they had contact with; they were 
New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina • 
. New York, with its broad valley corrido~s to the west, was the 
principal home of the Iroquois confederacy -- the "Lords Paramount of the 
red Complexion"3 as Edmond Atkin called them. This remarkable confederacy 
was composed of five Indian nations , the Onondaga, Cayuga, Oneida, Seneca, 
~nd Mohawk; after 1722 the Tuscarora migrated from South Carolina, making 
the Confederacy six nations . As early as the sixteenth century they had 
achieved a fairly complex federal system of government. A central council 
was maintained at Onondaga, and the tribes made all major decisions only 
in unanimous concert. Ferocious warriors , they were likewise masters of 
statecraft. Although their warriors probably never numbered over 2,000,4 
they cajoled or forced most of the tribes in western Pennsylvania and the 
Ohio Valley i nto alliances, so that they exercised suzerainty over an 
area that ran from the Ottawa to the Tennessee rivers and from the Kennebec 
3Wilbur Jacobs (ed.), Indians of the Southern Colonial Frontier: the 
Edmond Atkin Re~rt and Pl.an of l7,53'"""(Columbus , S.C.: University of Soutn 
Carolina Press , 954r,4r.- -
~rederick W. Hodge (ed.), Handbook of American Indians North of 
Mexico (New York: Pageant Books, Inc., 1939) , I, 619. 
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to the Illinois river and Lake Michigan. This vast empire was finally 
limited by human, not geographic, boundaries. The Cherokee cheeked their 
advance in the south, while the Chippewa formed a barrier in the west as 
did the French in the north.5 
In the constant rtvalry between French and English for Indian allies , 
the Iroquois Confederacy usually tended towards the English. They were 
vitally int~rested in the fur trade, and the most accessible trading post 
was English-held Albany. In addition, they profited greatly from acting 
as middlemen in handling the pelts of the western tribes; this function 
made the French their natural enemies. Charles Mcilwain explains "if the 
Iroquois permitted the Indians of the northwest to negotiate with the 
French and interposed no obstacle to the transportation of peltries from 
the _upper lakes to Montreal and Quebec, they would forfeit all the com-
mercial benefits that belonged to their geographic position."6 
The Intqh established a council fire -- a permanent meeting place - -
with the Iroquois at Albany; in addition the city was granted a monopoly 
for the fur trade. The English confirmed this privilege with a city 
charter granted by Governor Dongan in 1686.7 Although the Oltch and 
English governors frequently met with the Iroquois chieftains personally , 
city officials at Albany, usually traders themselves, conducted day-to-
day Indian affairs. In 1696, Governor Fletcher revised this organization 
and appointed a three-man Board of Commissioners to deal with the tribes. 
The system had many defects, but until the mid-eighteenth century the 
.. -·~·.··· 
5Ibid., 618. 
6charles Mcilwain (ed.), A!! Abrid~ent 2£ ~ Indian Affairs :!?z Peter 
Wraxall (Harvard Historical Studies, v~. XXI; Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
-sity Press , 1915), xxxix. 
?Allen Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York:~ Seventeenth 
Centuz:y (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), 208:---
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governors and this Board met with the Indians in their rigidly formal 
councils. Persist~ntly the French attempted to extend their influence 
over the Confederacy, b~t the governors of New York usually heard the 
Iroquois declare in their stylized form, "it is an Antient Custom to re-
new the Covenant Chain, and we that are left of the 5 Nations are now 
come to renew the same, to scour it clean & bright that it may shine like 
silver, and we prol1lise that it shall be kept on our part so strong that 
Thunder shall not break it."8 
Under the wise management of William Penn, the Quakers in Pennsyl-
vania had no early conflicts with the Indians. As the colony moved west, 
however, the Scots-Irish and German frontiersmen came in contact with the 
warlike western nations, particularly the Delaware and the Shawneeo These 
tribes were bound by enforced alliance with the Iroquois; a branch of that 
Confederacy lived in Pennsylvania, but their control over their fierce 
vassals was not always successf'ul. Pennsylvania had no permanent Indian 
department. For many years Conrad Weiser, a Palatine immigrant, was of-
ficial interpreter and therefore Indian ambassador for the colony.9 He 
had lived among the Mohawks and was a close friend of Shickellamy, the 
Iroquois vice-regent for the area. Weiser was in almost constant contact 
with the tribes, meeting them in formal council at Lancaster· and Phila-
delphia. Occasionally he even traveled to Albany to protect and expand 
the proprietor's hQldings. At first Weiser tried to work through the 
Iroquois Confederacy, but their hold over the western Indians was growing 
tenuous by the time of his death in 1760. As immigrants pushed Penn's 
settlement westward, the tribes became increasingly disconcerted. Affairs 
8Mcilwain, 25. 
9An excellent life of Conrad Weiser that also traces Pennsylvania 
Indian policy in the first half of the eighteenth century is Paul Wallace 9 s 
Conrad Weiser. 
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in the colony became confused as the settlers• demand for protection a~d 
expansion clashed ~th the pacifist policy of the Quaker-controlled As-
sembly at Philadelphia; for many years the frontier fanners lived in 
danger, often of their own making. 
The great tribes of the south were the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, 
Creek and Catawba, tribes that lived on the frontiers of Virginia, North 
and South Car9lina and Georgiao These tribes were not so civilized as 
the Six Nations, though they had come to occupy fixed towns except when 
hunting or on the warpath. They were not united into any confederacy and 
intermi ttenily made war on one another as well as mounting skirmishe,s 
against the Iroquois. They carried on a sizeable trade in deer skins with 
the English; Charleston was the center for this trade. The royal gover-
nors of South Carolina usually led the southern colonies in Indian af-
fairs. Governor James Glen was particularly vigorous in Indian affairs 
and tried unsuccessfully to persuade the British government to butld 
forts throughout Indian country for trading and administration. Assisted 
by state commissioners, he and his successors attempted to extend some 
control over trade, settle feuds between the tribes and purchase land for 
expansipn. 
In the eighteenth century, the importance of the Indians was further 
magnified by active rivalry with the French. Not only were the Fre,nch 
keen competitors for the profitable fur trade, but in time they came to 
be rivals for an American empire. In this deadly competition the Indi~ns 
were essential allies. "To preserve the ballance between us and the 
French is the great ruling Principle of the Modern Indian Politics,nlO 
Peter Wraxall, Indian Secretary at Albany, explained. The French maintained 
10 Mcilwain, 219. 
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a centralized Indian administration; they sent traders to the Indian 
country to purchase pelts and give presents to the red men, while priests 
often fQllowed to reinforce their message of loyalty. This centralized 
administration served the French interests well in Indian diplomacy. 
The British antagonists were not so successful. Occasionally the 
colonies cooperated; in 1722, Lieutenant Governor Alexander Spotswood of 
Virginia, Governor William Keith of Pennsylvania and Governor William 
11 Burnet of New York met together in Albany to negotiate with the Iroquois. 
More often they were at odds. Colony was pitted against colony to secure 
trade or lands for themselves, and governors fought with assemblies about 
expenses for Indian management. Thus vital steps were often left undone. 
Through these distressing circumstances ran the priv~te interests of the 
traders and land speculators, often working at cross-purposes with the 
official policies. The Board of Trade was told, "at present each distin~t 
Colony persue temporary Expedients .with the Indians without any regard to 
~ general interest.n12 Peter Wraxali saw little hope for New York to 
co~ciliate _the India~s because "our Albany Commissioners are too fat 
headed & have too much Belgick Phlegm for so judicious & Active a con~ 
duct. ttl3 
The chief area of concern was trade. To the Indians trade meant 
political alliance, and Englishmen began to understand that they could 
not protect their holdings and win an empire if they did not look to 
their commercial policies. The red men had come to a vital dependence on 
traders. Many had forsaken their ancient weapons, and guns and powder 
llibid.' 7. 
12Ibid., 62 nl. 
13 Ibid., 192. 
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were now necessary if these hunting people were to exist. In addition 
they placed a premium on cloth and paint and trinkets, the luxury items 
of their primitive civilization, while a great many had come to desire, 
above all, the rum that traqers inevitably brought. The great problem of 
colonial officials was maintaining some sort of control over these 
traders. Trading was a dangerous life, physically and economically, and 
it did not attract a very high caliber of men. Professor John Alden says 
Hin general, the traders were unscrupulous and abandoned wretches who 
trafficed heavily in rum, cheated their clients abominably, and abused 
them in every imaginable way.nl4 This opinion is corroborated by co-
lonial observers. Edmond Atkin emphasized that the southern traders were 
"the loosest kind of People, are dispis'd and held in great Contempt by 
the Indians as Liars and persons regarding nothing but their own Gain. 1115 
Peter Wraxall considered the traders who worked out of Albany to be de-
void of all virtue and cuttingly concluded that "tho my cursory reflections 
on the Albanian Indian traders are severe, they do not rise to the Infamy 
of their character.nl6 Cadwallader Colden concurred and told Governor 
Clinton that "the greatest discouragement in the management of Indian af= 
fairs is by the Indians being constantly cheated by them with what they 
deal •••• It is but too obvious what the consequences of this tre~t.-
ment must be."17 These men were hardly winning representatives of the 
empire. Most colonies passed laws to regulate the trade or , like South 
14John R. Alden, John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier (Ann 
Arbor: University of MichI'gan Press;-1944), 18. 
15Jacobs (ed.), 8. 
16Mcllwain, 197. 
17E. B. O'Callaghan (ed.), Documents Relative to the Colonial History 
of the State of New-York (Albany: Weed, Parsons andCompany, 1855), VI, ?Ir1:- ---
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Caroli~a, licensed th~ir traders, but Edmond Atkin tells a common story 
when he points out that "the Law for regul~ting the Indian trade is almost 
a dead Letter; and the colTll!lissioner is of little more use than going thro' 
the mere form of giving licenses to Traders and taking Bonds for the ob-
servanc.e of Instructions, which not being enforced are so little Re-
garded.ttl.8 
The British had one great advantage, for they could provide goods 
to the Indians at a cheaper ~ate than the French, but great danger existed 
that inept management of Indian affairs would "give the French that Extent 
of Dominion and Ballance of Trade which, but for our Indolence and im-
politic selfishness they could never possibly have compassed."19 As early 
as 1751, the Board of Trade began talking about organizing some sort of 
central administration for Indian affairs, 20 with various colonials urging 
them to do so. Edmond Atkin was asked to draw up a report on the I ndians 
for the Lords of Trade in 1755, and he insisted "the British Interest 
among the Indian nations in alliance with us ••• must in the present 
footing in the very nature of things continue to decline while we have any 
to loose and consequently there is an absolute Necessity of putting all 
Indian affairs immediately under some new and general Direction."21 
Peter Wraxall also told the Board of Trade "I am persuaded that putti ng 
tbe Indian trade under proper regulations is the only Method we have left 
to resist & overthrow the French influence among the Indians , in all 
other ways they are and will be our superiors.n22 
18 . Jacobs (ed.), 21. 
19Mcllwain, 77. 
20Alden, 41. 
21Jacobs (ed.), 36. 
22Mcllwain, 111 nl. 
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In 1754 the A:t,bany Congress met to discuss common defense, Indian al-
liance and .uni1:.ed control of trade. Various delegates expressed fear that 
the Iroquois might defect to _the French in the coming war; Cadwallader 
Cold~n spoke for most of them when he noted "the great advantage the 
~ench have is, that their affairs among the Indians are all directed by 
one Council • • • • "23 Tl:iese suggestions were not lost on Whitehallo 
There is some disagreement about the exact forces that sparked the British 
government into action, but generally "it would appear that the impending 
war convinced the home government that centralization of authority over 
Indian affairs was indispensable; the 'Representation' of the Albany 
Congress supported by the request of the Six Nations and by the papers of 
Thomas Pownall, furnished the major impetus leading to the establishment 
of the first Indian superintendencies •••• "24 
The British government set up two general superintendencies -- a 
northern and southern -- that corresponded roughly to the military di-
vision of the colonies. To the northern department William Johnson was 
appointed with a conmdssion from General Braddock dated April 14, 1755, 
giving him "sole management & direction of the Affairs of the Six Nations 
gf Indians & their Allies.n25 Johnson was to prove a happy choice and be-
came a superintendent of great ability and resource. in Irish immigrant, 
he lived among the Mohawk and learned their language, being adopted into 
their tribe •. He was a flamboyant person of apparent earthy charm and 
23o'Callaghan (ed.), VI, 744. 
24John R. Alden, "The. Albany .. ·Congress and the Creation of the Indian 
Superintendencies," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVII (Septem~ 
ber, 1940), 206. 
25sir William Johnson Papers. (Prepared for publication by the Di-
vision of Archives and History, State University of New York; Albany, 
1921), I, 465. 
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dar ing , and the Indians admired and trusted him. At his estate, Johnson 
Hall, in t he Mohawk Valley he welcomed and aided chief or warrior, always 
reminding them of their duty of loyalty to the British king. He exerted 
great influence over the Six Nations, and Peter Wraxall was probably not 
exaggerating when he said "they Lthe IroquoiiJ looked upon him as their 
Cheif [i.~ their Patron & their Brother they acted under his command & 
were almost wholly directed by himo"26 
To the southern post -- responsible for the area from Virginia south-
ward F.dmond Atkin, a Charleston merchant and member of the South 
Ca~olina Governor's Council, was appointed. At the time the Board of Trade 
established the superintendencies he was in u,ndon, and had drawn up for 
them a detailed report on the Indians and a plan for the superintendencies o 
Atkin was no~ so successful a superintendent as Johnsono Besides his 
harshness and short temper, he faced problems the northern superintendent 
did noto There was no confeder acy among the southern Indians, a fact 
which multiplied his work. In addition, he was always short of fundso He 
relied on the Commander-in-chief, General Loudon, and the southern gover-
nors for his funds, but both sources were unwilling to part with much 
money. He succeeded in holding several conferences with the Indians and 
finally arranged a truce between the Iroquois and the southern nations, 
but his ~dministration showed few other accomplishmentso Diplomacy fin.al-
ly failed, and war broke out between the southern colonies and the Chero-
kee in 17600 
I . 
The war was; put down with the aid of British regulars in 
1761, but it was a costly exper ienceo Atkin complained that he was op~ 
posed by jealous governors, lying traders and power-hungry assemblieso27 
2
~cilwain, 248 nl. 
27Jacobs (ed.), xxviii. 
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On his death in 1762 he was succeeded by John Stuart , another Charleston-
iano 
John Stuart proved to be vain, pompous , jealous of his authority, 
afflicted with gout, and an excellent superintendent. 28 He persuaded the 
southern governors to work with him and gained the respect of the 
southern Indians. Although the Creek were restless and trading abuses 
continued, Stuart maintained peace throughout his administrationo In 
fairness, he must be ranked with William Johnson as a great superin-
tendent. 
Although the creation of these superintendencies was an important 
step, defects remained in British Indian administration. Given royal 
commissions in 1756, both superintendents still remained under the 
control of the royal military commanders in :America. 29 William Johnson 
was unable to work effectively wi. th William Shirley, while General Arn-
herst' s interference in Indian policy did much to hasten Pontiac 0 s War. 
Most important, the superintendents were still unable effectively to 
control trade. The need for .further refinement in Indian administration 
was emphasized by the outbreak of serious Indian resistance in 1763. 
With the exodus of the French after 'their defeat in Canada, the 
Indians of the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region, especially the Ottawa, 
Chippewa and Huron, who were great French allies, were dissatisfied with 
British control, fearing that settlers would soon be penetrating their 
28Philip Hamer, "John Stuart's_ Indian Policy during_ the._ F.arly Months 
of the American Revolution," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XVII 
(December, 1930), 3510 · 
29It has been suggested that the military commander was solely re-
sponsible for Indian affairs; actually his control did not extend beyond 
some financial and military restrictions on the superintendents. See 
Clarence Carter, _ !'The Significance of the Mili ~~ry orf;~~Jn America, 
1763-1775," American Historical Review, XXVIII (lpril:.~l~ ,'" 475=488. 
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hunting grounds. This apprehension was intensified by General Amherst's 
decision to decrease the amount spent for presents for the red men and to 
restrict their supplies of powder and rum.30 This discontent was en-
couraged by French traders, who spread rumors of an imminent French re-
turn. War finally broke out in May, 1763, led by the Ottawa Chieftain 
Pontiac. The war was put down the next year, but only after all of the 
western forts except Detroit and Fort Pitt had been captured, nearly 
450 British regulars and hundreds of settlers had lost their lives, and 
the government put to great expense.31 
The British home government responded with two measures. The first 
step was to announce a policy for westward expansion. The first ex-
pression of this poli·cy was embodied in the Proclamation of 1763)2 This 
Proclamation drew an arbitrary line beyond which no settlement was al-
lowed. Indian lands falling within the colonies could be purchased only 
by the governor or military commander-in-chief, and private purchases 
were forbidden. Traders were required to be licensed by the colonial 
governors or royal commander. The boundary line of 1763 was only a 
temporary expedient; its object was to quiet Indian fears of encroachment 
and to provide for some sort of orderly, government-sponsored expansion. 
The British government viewed it as the first of a series of boundaries 
that would be constantly edging westward. Despite the wisdom of such a 
policy, the Proclamation was quite unpopular in the colonies especially 
with land speculators and those settlers already living within the pro-
scribed areas. 
30Howard H. Peckham, Pontiac and t.he Indian Uprising (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1947),101:r5'2. 
31 Ibid., 239. 
32!_. !_., I, 4th Ser., 172-175, 
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A second, and equally important reform, was the "Plan of 1764."33 
This comprehensive scheme, drawn up by the Board of Trade, would have 
place~ trading completely under t he .cont r ol of the superintendent. A 
fatal defect was the expense r equired to erlforce such an ambitious program; 
the British ministry proved unwilling to make such expenditures, and it 
was never promulgated. John Stuart tried to operate under its general 
provisions from 1765 to 1768, making a futile attempt to regulate the 
traders of the southern department. William Johnson made a similar ef-
fort. In 1768 Lord Shelburne announced that for reasons of economy trade 
would definitely remain in the hands of the individual colonies. An ab-
sence of official control over the fur trade was a continuing weakness 
of British administration. 
Despite their organizational and administrative orders, the British 
government was never successful in keeping settlers off Indian lands. 
Besides those individual families that were always at the outer edge of 
civilization seeking land or adventure, many influential colonial citi-
zens were involved in western land companies organized for large scale 
speculation.34 The superintendents were never able to hinder these 
companies appreciably from making illegal land purchases, a situation 
which had the unfortunate effect of setting many important colonials at 
odd$ with official policies. By 1770, William Johnson at the Treaty of 
Fort Stanwix and John Stuart at the Treaty of Lochaber had completed a 
series of agreements with the tribes that moved the 1763 line westward to 
the Ohio, thus opening sizeable new areas to settlement. But the fron •• 
tiersmen and the land companies pushed even beyond this limit. 
33o•callaghan (ed.), VIII, 637-641. 
34see generally, Thomas Perkins Abernethy~ Western Lands and the 
American Revolution (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Ltd., 1937). 
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On the very eve o! the Revolution, Virginia engaged in what was es~ 
sentially a speculator's war to secure the Kentucky area, land south of 
the.Ohio.and west of the Great Kanawha. This region was stoutly defended 
by the powerful Shawnee tribe because it constituted their principal 
hunting groundo The colony of Pennsylvania also laid claim to the area, 
and Virginia's governor, Lord Dunmore, hoped that by sending an army into 
the region Virginia's claim would be strengthenedo Settlers and land 
company surveyors steadily filtered into the area for some time; in 1774 
the Indians were aroused by one Michael Cresap, an agent for a Virginia 
land company, who wantonly murdered several Indians while mapping the 
area.35 The Indians retaliated by attacking settlers already on the 
lands, which conveniently pr911lpted the Virgini~ns to move in with armed 
forceso Lord Dunmore fielded an army that destroyed several Shawnee 
villages and finally forced the Indians to surrender at Camp Charlotteo 
An essential ingredient in their defeat was their isolation; by skill= 
ful negotiation, Williani Johnson had managed to keep the Six Nations out 
of the war while they in turn had kept the Delaware out, leaving the 
Shawnee without th~ aid they rightfuly expectedo36 
Pennsylvania protestep that Lord Dunmore's War was the action of 
"l~nd jobbers", and the Earl of Dartmouth, noting the provocation given 
the Indians, warned Dunmore that he must be careful to protect the king!s 
dignity and justice)? Richard Butler, a trader in the a1"'ea., reviewed 
the conduct of the Virginians leading to the war and f ou,nd, 
35 Ao A .. , I, 4th Sero, 3450 
- -
36Randolph Co Downes, "Lord Dunmore's War: An Interpretation~" 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review» XXI (Pecember, 1934), 327. 
37!· A·, I, 4th Ser~, 774-7750 
these facts, I think, wa$ sufficient to bring on a war with 
a Christian people instead of a i:;av~ge people ••• $ I am 
afraid for the Proceedings of t,he Chief of the White People -
in this Part of the Country that they will bring on a gener-
al war, as there is so little pains taken to restrain the 
common people whose prejudices leJd them to greater lengths 
than ought to be shown by Civilized People. o o and I'do 
reall~ think is much to blame themselves in the whole ar-
r ' 8 air. , 
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The defeated Indians finally agreed to move beyond the Ohio River, and the 
governor _secured their promise to meet with him the following year to draw 
specific boundary lines. But the governor would not be present at this 
conference; by then he had fl,ed to a British warship, and Virginia was in 
rebellion. 
_When the RevoluUonary War broke out,, then~ the British experience 
provided them undeniable advantages in competing for support of the Indianso 
They had appointed competent superintendents and had attempted to secure 
some measure of economic justice fo~ the red men. The superintendents 
lacked some necessary powers, but they did conduct all conferences with 
the Indians and through their demonstrated ability had a measure of in-
fluence over the colonial governors. Their cause ~s strengthened by the 
.unfavorable image.the colonists presented. Increasingly the Indians had 
come in contact with land~hung17 settlers -- often as barbarous as any 
Indian might be -- and the sharp-dealing speculators. This experience was 
hardly calculated to incline the Indians favorably to the patriot causeo 
Whatever the designs of the British, it was all too obvious that the co= 
lonials lusted after Indian lands9 The agents of the K'ing, on the other 
hand, were not slow to point out that they were the suppliers, advisors 
and protectors of the tribesQ curiously.enough, the situation was not un= 
like that which Britain had faced with the French, though in r~verse; the 
38p. A., IV, 570. 
- -
16 
British now had all the advantages while the eolonies labored under 
significant disadvantages. One impertant difference was the fact that 
the colonies did not have the lever or oheap goods with which the British 
had pried the Indians from their French allieso Whether they could pro~ 
duce an administrative structure that would be sufficient to overcome 
these obstacles and win the allegi~nee of the tribes was an open question, 
one that disturbed many thoughtful eolo:nistso 
CHAPI'ER II 
' 
THE FIRST YEAR 
This quarrel seems tous to.be unnatural; yo'Q. are· two 
brothers of one blopd " • • • We desire you will not 
apply to our Indian bret)4ren ••• for their assistance, 
let us Indians be all of one mind .. • • and you white 
people settle your own di!;!putes betw:lilct yourselves. · 
The .Oneida Indians to Governor 
Jonathan Trumbull, 17751 
In 1775 the American frontier was pushing beyond the mountains in a 
surge of expansipn •. No longer only, menacing the periphery of Indian 
countryi colonial settlers were actually moving into its hearto Besides 
tra<::litional irritants<>£ trade abuses.and foreign intrigue, Revolutior1a:cy 
Americans would soon have to face this new element of increasingly in .. 
tense Indian resentment of frontier encroac}µnent .. The transmountain 
settlements would present n<>vel defense problems to patriot officials and 
military commanders. Defending armies would require supplies that llIUSt 
be carried over mountain ranges, and the settlements would be too distant 
from one another for mutual protection. No longer would there be British 
regulars to rescue settlers f:romthe Indians; citizen militia would have 
to be raised, and they would be burdened with families and crops to tendo 
It wasduring a sensitive, transitional period on the frontie:r that the 
American.colonies chose to revolt. 
To add to the settlers' woes, there was a vacuum of le1;1,dership on the 
frontiero July 11, 1774, old Sir William Johnson died, leaving bis 
lAo A., 4th Ser., II, .1117 .. 
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superintendency to his .,nephew Sir Guy Johnson and his deputies Da.niel 
Claus and John Butler; while sld.U.f'ul, these men would never attain Sir 
William's mastery of the I:rf)quois. In Charleston, John Stuart, the sta-
bili~ing influel'lce in the south, had not.long to live himselfo Among the 
Indians, the unity of the Iroquois Confederacy began to show signs of 
weakness, and no great chieftain appeared to lead the emerging tribes 
breaking away from the lr~quois empireo2 This shift would add confusion 
to the wartime frontiere 
In the imperial wars between England and France, the contending 
factions traditiotl(llly had sought to involve the Indians; thus the pro-
testing and soon rebelling colonists fully expected the British to vie 
with them for support of tl,,e Indian nationso The frontier from Maine to 
Georgia was always :rife with rumol"S of impending doomo .Slow means of 
communications and the distance of the frontier from the settled areas~ 
helped feed these l"\ll!lo:rs a,nd added to the feeling of isolation and help-
lessness.that would grip many settlers as they sought to maintain their 
outposts .. 
The speed with which the individual colonies moved to secure peace 
for their frontiers indicated the importance they attached to the war 
might of their red neighbors. In.May, 1??5,.the M~ssachu$etts Provision= 
al_Congress wrote to the small, scattered tri~es on their frontier to 
explain that the: British were trying to enslave both colonist and Indiano3 
2or future Indian leaders, Corn~talk of the Sl14wnee, wa.s.under a 
temporary cloud because of his defeat in Lord Innmore's War, l)ragging 
Canoe was frustrated by the aging Cherokee hierarchy and Alexander Mo-
Gillivray of the Creeks and Joseph Brant.of ... the .. Iroquois ... had .. not.yet · 
risen. to power~- .... Dale Van Every, A Compa& of Heroes: The American 
Frontier, !ZZ.2-1785 (New York: William Morrow and Company,' 1962), Zi4o 
3'" . . Ao!,, 4th Sero, II, 610-6110 
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Co~juring_~p_a,_c~nity or inte~es:ts that ~s:t have bewilf:iered the 
Il'l.dia:ris, coming fJ,'Ol!'l the P!iritans oi'_Massachusetts aa,y, they grandly de-
clared that "our li'IJerty and your liberty is the same, we are brothers 
and_ what is _ou:r. good is for_ your good, and we, by standing togetther., shall 
make those w:i,c,ked men afraid, and overcome them and all be freemen.,"4 
Fast on the heels of·these sentiments came an invitation. to join the co-
lonial militia; the invitation was sweetened by promises of wages, a 
blanket and a ribbon for~ volunteerso5 Fearing the Mohwaks, the most 
easterly or. the Confederacy, .the Massachusetts government sent a dele.ga-
tion or Stockb:ridge Indians to reason with that tribe and explain the 
qolonial_ causeo Letters were. written to the Reverend Samuel Kirkland, 
missionary to.the_Oneid@.and Tuscar.ora, urging him to promote colonial 
allegiance __ among. those tribe1:1; if that_ ratled, '.qe was at least to secure 
their neutr.alityo· . Tl:l.e Rave~enc:i Eleazar Wheelock, the Indian educator, 
~s requested to ~ppr.oac:,h Joseph Brant., an ex~student and a rising chief 
of the Six Nations. and secure hi~ influence am9ng __ those tribeso 
Frol!l Crown __ P<>int, .. Ethan Allen w.rote to the Canadian Indians inviting 
them to join his forces and "ambush" British regulars.. .Allen advised the 
Massachusetts .Prov±:sional Congress that the Canadian tribes would join the 
side that seemed strongest and exhorted,. "I wish to God America would :ex-
ert herself in the proportion to the indignities offered her by a ty-
rannical Ministeryo She might mount on eagle's wings to gloryo"6 
New York had obvious reason to fear Indian hostilities since the most . 
powerful confederacy Qn the continent lived on her very doorstepo Sir Guy 
Johnson removed superintendency qperations to qanadat but Sir John, his 
4:rbido 
5Ibido 
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nephew and Sir William's son, gathered his Soots and Indian retainers 
around -him .at Johnson Hall. and virtually blockaded Tryon oounty.7 This 
was cause for alarm for the_New York Provincial Congress, and rumors of 
Sir John6 s supposed evil intents spread through the New York countrysideo 
The Provincial Congress was not slow to instruct its delegates in the 
Continental Congress on tT-g.ne 7, 1775: 
The importance and t~e necessity of attention to Indian 
affairs is deeply ixnpressed on our minds, 'because our 
public peace i.s more endangered by the situation of the 
barbarians to the westward-of us, than it oan_pe by any 
inroads made upon the seacoast. Britain.will spare the 
,1ast for her own sake, · and policy will tea.ch her .minis ... , 
ters to light upon an Indian war upon bur-frontiers, that 
we may be drawn for protection to embrace the terms of 
slaver.vo To obviate~uchevils will, we hope, occupy a 
considerable share of your attent.ion.8 
The delegates were also advised to give oaref'ul consideration to the 
merits of an appointment of a continental Indian superintendent. 
The Pennsylvania frontier was also a sensitive area. The center of 
frontier defense, Fort Pitt, was enclosed in a semi-circle of Shawnee9 
Delaware, Mingo and vl,y"andotte warriors. These fierce tribes had no central 
confedeiracy to negotiate with. The Sha'Wl'.lee and Mingo still resented their 
defeat in Lord l)lnmore's War; vl,y"an.dotte lands were far enough west to be 
out of practical range for American retaliation, but close enough for 
Wyandotte wa~riors to mQunt raiding expeditionso 
Two additional problems aggravated the situation on the Mi.d~le Fron-
tiero Settlers had begun to push- far into the hunting grounds of the 
Indianso This movement was accelerated by the substantial land cession 
of Ohio lands made by the Iroquois at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 17680 
The western tribes questioned the right of the Confederacy to make this 
7Ibido, 9390 
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oessiono Since the area had been conquered by the Iroquois a eentlll'Y be-
fore, they claimed the right to cede it and receive all resulting bene~ 
fitso The western nations, however, rejected the Iroquois claim; this 
rejection was strengthened by the fact that the western tribes had no= 
where to go had they been willing to relinquish their homes. Colonials 
als.o had their problem of ju.risdiotiono Both Con.nectiqut a:md Pennsylvania 
claimed the Wyoming Valley area, while V1rgil'lia and Pemisylvania disputed 
ownership of the Fort Pitt regiono The colonists were bitter in their 
land riva;Lry, 'With their jealousy and greed preventing a united effort to 
protect these areas. 
On receiving the news of Lexington, Virginia appointed George washing~ 
ton, Thomas Walker, Adam Stephens, John Walter and James Wood to a com .. 
mission, ordering them to meet.with the Indians at Fort Pitt, conclude 
Lord Dll:nmore's War, and sue for Indian support in the developing dispu.te 
with Britaino9 This conference met in September and October, 1775, and 
Thomas Walker reported to Thomas Jefferson: 
The·tew Indians here seem perfectly well disposed towards 
us, and all things would go on well were·it not for the 
unhappy territorial dispute between the two colonies which 
has proceeded to an inconceivable length, and we are sorry 
to say that an eminent gentleJD.B:n LJames W1lsori[who we 
conceive was sent.here for very different purposes appears 
to us to have greatly interested himself in this affair.10 
The commissioners urged the Indians to neutralityoll In return they agreed 
to the Ohio River as a pe:rm.anent Indian boundry, a promise they had no 
real means or keepingo Throughout 1776 the western naticms remained 
9Ibido, 12400 
lOThoma.~ Walker. to Thomas. JeffE1rson, Sept•ber, 1775, Julian Po Boyd 
(edo), Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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relatively peacetu.1, bllt this situation was more the accomplishment of 
the Continental Congress than the Virginia emissaries. The assault on 
Canada, lasting from September• 1775,·until Ju.ne, 1776, closed the St. 
Lawrence to the British and preventfd them. from supplying the Indians with 
the 8.l'ms, amm.u.nition and presents that were necessary to mobilize them to 
war. · When in 1777 this supply line was reopened, all these tribes, with 
the excepti·on of a few Delaware under Chier White Eyes, would prove 
hostile to the Americans .. 
Like dwellers in other colonies, southerners were apprehensive about 
which side the sou.them Indians would favor if war with England cameo For 
several years land speculators and individual settlers had been pushing 
deep into the wilderness and making homes along the Holston, watauga and 
Nolichuoky; these settlements produqed great uncertainty in the Cherokee-
colonial relations. The war-like Creek were unstable neighbors even in 
the best of times, and they produced uneasiness in South Carolina and 
Georgiae When the news of Lexington reached Charleston, rumors were wide~ 
ly credited that John Stuart, the southern superintendent, was urging the 
Cherokee· and Catawba to attack the frontier; he was forced to leave his 
sick bed and flee to Georgia and ultimately Pensaoola.o 12 The Charleston 
Committee of Safety seized British powder meant for the Indian trade13 
I;;,. 
12At le~st this earl.Ji Stu.art was probably tru.thf'ul when he testified 
to the Committee of' Safety, "I-never have received any orders from my 
superiors which by the most tortured constraction could be interpreted to 
spirit up or employ the Indians :to fall upon the frontier inhabitants; or 
to take any part in the.dispu.te .. between Great .. Britain. .. and ... her eolonieso" 
John Drayton, .. Memoirs .. or :,the .. American .. Revolution •... From. Its .. Commencement .. · .. 
to. the Year.1770 .. InolusI've; As .. Relatip; to ·tHe Sta~fSouth-.Carolina and 
Oocasi'oian'~erinft to !h!, States o North-Carolina '1}i! Geor a Charies-
t.on: x. E. :I.fer, 1 m, I, 2~3.. }l';'o see Ph.U.ip M. Hamer e O ' 110orres-
pondenoe . of Heney .. Stu.art and .. Alexander Came,ron with the Wa ta11.gas," Mis sis ... 
sippi Valley HistC!>rical .Review, XVII. (December 1930), 451-459.. · 
13:!,. !_., 4th Ser., III, 792 .. . .. 
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and sent state commissioners to negotiate with the Indian$. 
In such piecemeal fashion the colonies initially attempted to re-
lieve the Indian threat. Local management or Indian affairs was,, after 
all, a part of their colonial heritage only recently interferred with by 
the British govermnento This was one level of administration that would 
exist throughout the war and for years afterwardso The individual co-
lonies, with their jealausies and cont'lieting interests, were not fully 
competent, however, to handle what would soon become a national, rather 
than a local, problem; another level of management, that of the Conti= 
nental Congress, was soon superimposedo 
The Second Continental Congress, meeting in Philadelphia during the 
long summer of 1775, was soon to realize the necessity of assuming some 
responsibility for Indian affairs. On Friday, June 16, the important 
business of the day was to inform George Washington that he had been ap= 
pointed commander-in-chief of the forces "raised in defense of American 
liberty" and to appoint Shilip Schuyler, Pa.trick Henry, James Duane, James 
Wilson and Philip Livingston to a committee to consider some papers sent 
from New York :relative to Indian affairs and to "report what steps, in 
their opinion, are necessary to be taken f'or securing and preserving the 
friendship of the Indiannationsonl4 For almost a month this committee 
I 
studied the Indian situation, interviewed interested parties, and un= 
dou.btedly heard the sprea,ding rwnors of an immediate Indian a.ttaeko On 
July 12, the committee issued a full report that was accepted by Congress,.15 
Reoognizin:g that the British would "spare no pains" to win over the 
Indians, the committee thought "it becomes us to be very active and 
14,i. Qo Qa, II, 9Jo 
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vigilant in exerting every prudent means to strengthen and confirm ~he 
Ind.ian•9]' friendly disposition towards these colonies •••• ..i6 The 
committee saw the potential advantage that was theirs since "the Indians 
depend oh the Colonists for arms, ammunition, and cloathing, whieh are 
become necessary to their subsistence o • o • ..i7 They recommended that 
commissioners be appoint$d to supervise the affairs of the Indians, pro-
viding for a decentralized organization of three departments .. The 
Northern Department would have three commissioners and inolude the Iro= 
quois Confederacy and all nations to the north or them. The SO'l!l.thern 
Department, with .f'ive commissioners, wouJ.d reach from the Cherokee 
country southward. The Middle Department's three commissioners would 
superintend affairs ot all the t:ribes between the other two. Com-
missioners were given the power to treat with all Indians in their de-
partments in the name or the United Colonies and to select agents from 
among men with i1'1fluence in the Indian nations. These agents were to 
live near the Indians and maintain a $Urveillance not only on the tribes, 
but also on the Crown agents~ Ir the royal a.gents were found to be pro-· 
moting hostility towards the colonies, the commissioners were authorized 
to seize themo 
On the next day, Jaly 13, Benjamin Franklin, Patrick Henry and James 
Wilson were elected as oommissioners for the Middle' Departmento18 Philip 
Schuyler, Joseph Hawley, Turbot Franois and Oliver Walcott were chosen 
for the Northern Department.19 It was July 19 before Congress had time 
l6Ibido t 1740 
17 Ibid. t 1750 
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l9Ibido Joseph Hawley later declined to serve as commissioner for 
the Northern Department; likewise Patrick Henry resigned from the Middle 
Departmento An unf'i:mished entry for the day indicates that Volkert Po 
Douw was also chosen a commissioner ror- the Northern Department. 
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to activate the Southern Department b;y authorizing the Committee of Safety 
of South Carolina to select three of the commissioners for the southern 
region, with Congress adding John Wal.ker20 and Willie Jones21 to their 
numbero Many of the Congressmen had experience with local Indian affairs 
in their own colonies, and they knew the expense that Indian af':f'airs de-
m.andedo The Indians :mu.st be supported at all meetings, with fairly lavish 
present-giving an inescapable obligation. Therefore they provided $10,000 
for the Southern Department and $6,666 2/3 each for the Northern and 
Middle Departments, to be drawn from the oentinental treas'tll"y'o 
Congress, then, recognized the need for special attention for the 
~ians as the British had in 1763. They patterned their geographic di-
visions on the British plan with an addition of' the Middle Department, 
indicating the growing importanee of the westward movement in this area 
and the slow breakdown of Iroquois authorit;yo This was a wise decision, 
for the western nations would, in the coming ;years, act independently of 
the southern and northern tribes, presenting an independent problem of a 
geographically unified area. They had not the organization or experience 
of the other Indians; which made the Middle Depart.ment a troublesome as ... 
sigmnent tor any commissioner. An unfortunate deviation from the British 
pattern was the institution of. :multiple commissioners .. One of the ad ... 
vantages Sir William Johnson and John Stt1art had enjoyed had been the 
freedom of action and the continuity of procedure each could effect. FUll 
realization of these potentials was not possible in the committee s;ystemo 
Beyond this, the selections. made were not the besto Of the twelve com-
missioners, five were Congressmen, and the others were active in local 
20Ibido 9 1920 
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politios. All o:f' them had other impoJ;"tant duties, with the result that 
frontier diplomaey was sometimes slighted in order to give more attention 
to other pressing problems:• Th~mas MeKean, later a commissioner in the 
Middle Department, served on thirty-three committees and was chairman of 
five in one term of Congress; another term he was on nineteen committees 
and chairman of six. 22 Perhaps it is also signifioant that five of the 
first commissioners, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas walker, James Wilson, 
Turbot Francis and John walker, were men who we~e directly or indirectly 
connected with land speculation ventures •. This vested interest m~y have 
provided them with certain preconceived notions about the conduct of 
Indian affairso 
Like their British counterparts, the commissioners were ambassadors 
and advisers to the tribes, while the locus of ~nitiating Indian policies 
resided elsewhere; in this ease, it was in the Continental Congress6 Yet 
in the Congress itself, there was no permanent Indian secretariato 
Congress was slow organizing itself into an effective administrative bodyo 
The delegates of the 1775 session had no idea that they woud be in sessio,n 
for the next fourteen years; even as th:is fact became more apparent, the 
Congressmen had few precedents to gtrl.de them in an era of rather ort1de 
administrative skillso Dlring the winter of 1775=1776 11 the initiation 
and review of Indian affairs was vested in special committees, appointed 
to deal with specific problems and dissolved on their solt'l.tiono This 
pattern, of oou~se, provided no continuity of overall policyo In April, 
1776, when the retrea1:._f~Qm Montreal had become inevitable and distressing 
news about the Six Nations was ooming in, Congress appointed a Standing 
22Jennings Bo Sanders, .Evolution .2!,. Executive Departments 2,! ~ 
Continental Co~ress, 1774 ... l'Z!l2. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
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Committee on Indian Affairs composed or George Wythe, James Wilson, Oliver 
Wolcott, Lewis Morris, and F,dward Ratledge. 23 By the end of the yeart the 
committee was composed of Wilson, Rutledge, James l)lane (appointed May 16), 
Thomas Jefferson, Philip Livingston, and Samuel Htllntington (all appointed 
July 6)0 24 Even this attempt at permanenae was hindered, then, by nuetu ... 
a.ting personnelo Standing committees were appointed until 1779, when the 
Boa.rd 0f War seems to have taken over their du.tieso The Boa.rd of War was 
relieved of control in 1782, when Indian affairs were placed under the 
newly created Secretary of Waro 
In the remaindel"' 0f their first year, the Second Continental Congress 
laid the general pattern for its wartime conduct of Indian affairso 
Congress interested itself in the most minute of Indian problems .. Eleazar 
Wheelock was granted a request of $500 to pay tuition for some Canadian 
Indian boys at his school; Congress hoped this generosity would favorably 
influence those tribes~ The Reverend Samuel Jd..rkland, who was to prove a 
tireless Indian agent, was employed by Congress to serve as missionary 
and Congressional representative among the Iroquoiso Mro Jd..rkland worked 
principally among the One~da and Tuscarora., with these two tribes remain= 
ing faithful. to the patriot oause when the other members of the Confeder= 
aoy had def eeted to the British.. Vario,u.s deputations of Indi·ans were 
entertained in Philadelphia., . but they seldom included the important chiefs 9 
and the expense and bother of the visits would become most vexing to 
Congresso A committee was appointed to devise means for procuring goods 
for trade with the Indians; Congressmen were realistic enough to know that 
they stood little chance of retaining Indian support if they failed to 
supply trading goods. Congress made etf'orts each year to secure these 
items, which were then sold to private traders who would go among the 
tribeso The oommissi0~ers were ordered to license all traders to pro-
i 
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hibit sharp dealings, but little evidence is round that the commissioners 
were able, or even made• sincere effort, to ma.inta,in this elose re-
striction.25 The Northern commissioners were authorized to engage an 
26 interpreter ~t .250 per year; Jam.es Deane was exnployed· and was another 
of the small.number of effective .Am.erican agentso 
Finally, a message was sent to the tribes explaining the radimentary 
policy which the Congress had worked outo Though some colonies had at-
tempted to enlist Indians in their local militia, the Congress seems 
fairly well agreed th.at the Indians should be kept out of the war and 
urged to a strict neutrality .. Both British and Amerioans had a reluctance 
to use Indians as f'igh.ting men -... though both sides would enlist their aid - · 
before the war was over. Particularly after the French and Indian War, 
there was a certain horror at unleashing them in.this fratricidal st?"l1ggleo 
John Adams explained that "the Indians are known to conduct their Wars so 
entirely without Faith and Humanity, that it wuld bring eternal In.ta.my 
on the Ministry throughou.t Ea.rope if they should excite these Savages to 
war· o o o o To let those blood Hounds to scalp Men and to butcher Women 
and Children i~ hor:rido"27 The policy of neutrality was also a practical. 
one; while the colonists knew of the Indian• s might, they also knew of 
the expense involved in tempting him to fight, the fickleness and dif'fi ... 
culty of commanding him and his indiscriminate cruelty, when &r<)'\lsed, that 
25Ibido, IV, 970 
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might lead him to att-.ck both friend and :toe. The message, sometimes 
delving into :political theory and sometimes using the most childlike 
simplifications, gave the colon1.a1 expla:nation f'or the stnggle and ad ... 
vised, "we desire you to remain at home and not join on either side, but 
keep the hatchet bu.ried deep .. n28. 
CHAPTER III 
.THE WAR YEARS, I 
Ours is a kind of stl"t1ggle designed I dare say by 
Providence to try the patience, fortitude and virtue 
of men o o o o General Mo.Intosh is only experiencing 
upon a. small Sea.le, what I have had a.n ample share of 
upon a. large one; and must, a.s I ha.ve been obliged to 
do in a. variety of Instances, yield to necessity; •. , 
o o • or in other Word.s if he cannot do as he wishes, 
. he nmst do what he ca.no 
George Washington to Andrew Lewisl 
The years of the Revolutionary war were a stage for three separate 
wars on the American continent: one between the Continental forces and 
the British, one between American patriots and Tories, and a bitter war 
on the frontier between determi?').ed, land-hungry settlers and equally de .... 
termined Indians fighting for their hunting groundso Sometimes these 
struggles overlapped, other times they went separate and independent 
ways. The war with the Indians received the least of Congressffs at= 
tention, for it least directly affected the ma.in struggle, the seaboard 
contest for political freedom. This is not to say that the events in the 
west were unimportanto The militia, though poorly trained and supplied 
and sometimes cowardly and cruel, did manage to contain the fury of the 
tribes to the frontier. For six yea.rs and more they were unable to bring 
peace to the west, but the frontier forces did keep the attacking tribes 
from penetrating to the older and more populous area.so In this way they 
1George 'Washington to Andrew Lewis, October 15, 1778, John Co Fitz-
patrick (ed.), Writin's .2!. George 'Washington (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, i9:3g , XIII, 79,. tHereinafter cited as Washington 
Writings.) 
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freed Continental troaps f(!)r seaboard duty. In addition, the years of' 
the Revolution saw an ever increasing f';rontier popalation despite the 
hardships the settlers had to endure. These determined settlers and th.e 
conquests of their militia provided a claim to the Old Northw~st that was 
successf'ully maintained at the treaty table in 1783.2 
In 1775-1776 both British and Americans raced to obtain Indian 
support. The commissioners of each Congressional department sought to 
bind the tribes to them by treaties and presents, never neglecting the 
latter. Men who knew Indian affairs c011ld only agree with the Georgia 
legislators who told General Lee, "it is a fixed principle with the 
Indians to be paid for their good of:f'ioes., and in this controversy they 
will expect to be paid well, even for their neutrality."3 This provided 
a rather one-sided competition, for Britain, with her control of the seas 
' 
and her greater financial and industrial resou.rees, could easily out-
distance the Continental Congress, which was often unable to pay and pro-
vision its own soldiers. Congress periodically ordered the commissioners 
to procure clothing, teols and trinkets for the Indians,4 but they were 
unable to matoh the British and sometimes unable to s-.pply anything at 
all. Likewise, there is no evidence that the blacksmiths, missionaries 
and teachers that Congress authorized5 were ever employedo The British, 
working f'rom posts at Detroit, Niagara, Ma.eld.nao, Pensacola and the 
2This is listed as,a "momento•s consequence" of western events in 
Louise Phelps Kellogg, "Indian Diplomacy Dllring the.Revolution in the 
West," Illinois State Historical Society Transactions, XXXV'I (1929), 560 
31. C .. Candler (ed1i), Revolutionas'r Records ,2! ~ State !!. _Qeorgia 
(.Atlanta: Franklin-Turner C0111pany, 190 , I, 154.. '1 
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Canadian bases WOllld exploit this material weakness to its limit. 
The Northern and Middle Departments enjoyed a period ot qui.et in 
1775-1776 because the Canadian campaign had olesed the st. Lawrence supply 
line, but the British agents were busy confirming the Indians in their 
loyalty to the king. It was the initial plan of the royal ministry to 
use the Indians only in conj11nction with forces of British regulars. There 
was no plan yet to wage real frontier war on the rebelling colonies, but 
the king's officials had no intention of foregoing the support that the 
warriors could provide. 
This period of qtliet was a welcome one, tor the frontier was practi-
cally detenseless. Many fighting inen had gone east to the major theatre 
of war, and there was no force to organize the west for its own defense on 
any great seale. Hoping to protect the borders of New York and New 
England.by a barrier of peacehl Iroquois, General Philip Schuyler, of 
the Northern Department, moved quickly to secure an agreement with those 
tribes. In August and September of 1775, he called a preliminary- meeting 
at German Flats and urged the Six Nations to attend a full conference at 
Albany .. The pttrpose ot the Albany meeting was to persuade the Indians to 
follow the Congressional policy of neutrality. The meeting elicited 
promises of neutrality,'but it was not an unqualified successo Joseph 
Brant kept the Mohawks .from sending a:n;r delegates, and many influential 
Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca were not presento Those delegates who did 
attend did not hide their affection for their British agents or their 
loyalty to the kingo 6 Schuyler complained that the meetings went slowly 
and, after hours or the ceremonies the Indians demanded, the chiefs were 
not loath to suggest, "as we are weary from having sat long in Council we 
6!• !•; 4th Ser., III, 486. 
33 
think it time £or a little drink."? The Reverend Samuel ICirkland had in-
nuenced the Oneida and Tllsoarora to stand with the .Americans, but it was 
too apparent that the other l'lations were almost lost. 
Schuyler had also hoped to win over the Canadian Indians to aid in 
American attacks on Canada. He received "melancholy" news from Eth.an 
Allen that the latter had sent an emissary to Canada to treat with those 
tribes, but the messenger had been shot in the forehead "of which he im-
8 
mediately expiredo" The best General Schuyler co'llld hope for was an un-
easy truce as he sought to counteract growing British influeneeo 
British inf1uenoe in the south was under the capable direction of 
John Stuart who, though he was mortally ill, kept supplies flowing to the 
Cherokee and Creek from his base at Pensacola. William Henry Drayton, 
commissioner for the SO'ltthern Department, oirc'lllated a talk to "The Be. 
loved men, Head men and Warriors or the Cherokee Na.tionn9 presenting the 
colonial cause and urging the Cherokee to remain at peace and "eheerOOly" 
submit to a shortage of goods and ammu.ni.tion until the 'state could open 
new trade routeso Stuart's agents oOlll.d promise the Indians more than 
future goods; through the winter of 1775, they armed the Cherokee so the 
warriors might cooperate with the British force preparing to attack the 
southern colonieso 
In June, 1775, the British force under Sir Peter Parker ~nd Sir.Henry 
Clinton failed in its attack·on Charleston, but the Indians c;,ou.ld ~ot be 
restrainedo By J'llly, Dragging Canoe pel".suaded a sizeable part of the 
Cherokee nation to strike the southern frontier from southern Virginia to 
7Ib:ido, 4740 
8 Ibido, 49'.3o 
9!• AG, 4th Ser .. , III, 790-794. 
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northern Georgia, killing and burning. There were frantic rum.ors that 
the whole southern frontier might be abandoned, but the southern states 
fielded troops and, in a rare show or cooperation, delivered decisive de-
feats to the Indi.ans .. 10 ''Nothing will reduce these wretches so soc:m as 
pushing the war into the heart of their country," advised Thomas Jeffer-
son, "but I would not stop persuing ~i~ them while one of them remained 
on this side or the Mississippi • .,ll 
In June the South Carolinians destroyed the Middle Towns, and Vir-
ginia forces attacked the Overhill settlements., By October the Cherokee 
were defeated; Dragging Canoe retreated to the Chickamauga to continue 
the raids, bu.t the fighting power of the Cherokee nation was largely 
brokeno By the treaty of De Witts Corner, May 20, 1777, the lower Chero-
kee surrendered their remaining land in South Carolina; at the treaty of 
Long Islandt June 20, 1777, the Overhill ehiefs gave up tribal holdings 
east of the Blue Ridge and the region occupied by the Watauga and Noli-
ehucky settlementsgl2 This action, managed, directed and financed en-
tirely by the Southern States, was probably the most suoeess.f'll.1 military 
operation against the Indians of the entire waro 
If 1776 had been a year of uncertainty in Indian affairs, the worst 
became apparent in 1777~ In March o:t the "year o:t the three sevens" the 
· Shawnee and Mingo led with furious attacks on the Kentucky setUements o 
The settlers fled to three fortresses, Boonesborough, Harrodsburgh and St~ 
Asaph. No Continental forces could be spared, so that the Kentucky 
10Drayton, II, 352~3530 
11 . Thomas Jefferson to John Page, August 59 1775, Papers .2£ Thomas 
Jefferson, I, 485=4860 
12Drayton, n, 3620 
Stations had to rely on their own disorganized forces and such aid as 
Virginia. could afford them. 
3.5 
On April 10, 1777, Congress sent General Edward Hand te take oo:m.mand 
of Fort Pitt and the Middle Department frontiero13 This was an assignment 
ma.de more difficult beoause of the divisive dispute between Virginia. and 
Pennsylvania. over ownership of the areao Edward Hand was the first of a 
succession of c0mma.nders who would find to their frustration that the 
magnitude of their assignment, combined with the paucity of men and 
~upplies and the ungovernable nature of the frontiersmen, presented an 
impossible tasko 
Lt .. Govel:"nor Henry Hamilton, the British commander at Detroit, was 
ordered to harass the frontier; he lacked men, drained off for the St., 
Leger-Burgoyne campaign, to oo:mmand large sea.le operations, and the best 
that he could do was encourage promiscuous raidingo Throughout mid= 
summer and fall the warriors fell on the Pennsylvania border 51 driving the 
settlers before themo In November, western citizens reported to Presi= 
dent Sa.mu.el Wharton of Pennsylvania "the present situation of this Country 
is so trtll.y deplorable that we should be inexcusable if we delayed a 
moment in acquainting you with.it, an Indian War is now raging a.round us 
in its utmost fu.ry.,"14 They ~lso insisted that not a day went by without 
news of some raid, with people fleeing the frontier in large numbers; 
indeed, there was danger of depopulation if something was not done im= 
mediatelyol5 But neither Congress nor Pennsylvania had any aid to sendo 
l}Wj.lliam To Hutchinson and William M. E .. Rachel (edso ), Papers of 
James Madison (Chica.go: Universi.ty of Chicago Press, 1965), I, 217 n77°' 
14Thomas Smith and George Woods to President Wharton (of Pennsylvania), 
November 27, 1777, .f. !~, VI, 39., 
l.5Ibid .. , 40. 
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!)iring this year, when major portions of the western settlers were 
fighting tor their lives, Congress rarely fo~nd time even to discuss 
Indian affairs. John Adams explained: 
When fifty or sixty men have a Constitution to form for a 
great empire, at the same time that they have a country 
of fifteen hundred miles in extent to fortify, millions 
to arm and train, a naval power to begin, an extensive 
army of twenty-seven thousand men to raise, pay and 16 
viotual,I shall really pity those fifty or sixty men. 
Hard pressed to maintain the war in the east, Congress had no material 
· aid to offer the frontier, had they found time to consider its plighto 
On October 4, 1777 a new standing Committee on Indian Affairs was 
elected, consisting of James Duane, George Walton, Thomas Burke, Joseph 
Jones and Richard Law .. 17 They sent three commissioners to Fort Pitt to 
seek peace with the Indians and prepare for an attack on Detroit, the 
source of Indian hosti.lities.18 The commissioners, of course, could .find 
no Indians to negotiate w.i,th, and an attack on Detroit was to be a con~ 
tinuing daydream 0£ the Continental Congress. Through most of the war, 
the forces at Fort Pitt were hardly strong enough to maintain that post, 
much less lead an aggressive campaign to distant Detroito Had there been 
sufficient forces, the Indians would not grant permission to cross their 
lands for the attack. While Detroit remained in British hands, the Indians 
would continue hostile; while the Indians were hostile, there was no hope 
of attacking Detroit. It was a vicious circle., · 
The raids finally dwindled with the coming of winter -... Indians 
avoided winter fighting whenever possible~- and all Congress could do 
16charles Francis Adams, Familiar Letters of' John Adams and His "Wife 
Abigail. Adams, . During the Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflinand -
Company, l875), 85. -
17,io £. .. £.•,IX, 776. 
18Ibid., 992-9940 
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was send a peremptory message to the Six Nations 'berliUng them tor their 
continued loyalty to the British, demanding that they exercise au.thority 
over the western tribes arui call a halt to their attacks.19 "LGok into 
your hearts, and be attentive. Milch are you. to blame, and greatly have . 
you wronged uso Be wise in time. Be sorry for and mind you faults .. "20 
Bold and arrogant threats and inst?'llletions the commissioners penned, .but 
they __ had nothing to baok them 11.p, and the Indians knew this to be true .. 
l;i ·-
Predictably the message had no effeeto 
It was. a partiowlarly b?'llltal type of warfare the settlers f'a.eed .. 
Sinoe the British were not a.s successful milita:rily a.s they had hoped, 
they were unable to use the Indians as auxiliaries in planned campaigns. 
Left to their own devices, the red men were the terror of the frontier .. 
They would fall on an isolated farmhouse, kill all its inhabi,ta.nts, re-
gardless of age or sex:, bll;i:-n. everythi~g, and sli:p baqk into the forest .. 
An ingrained hatred of th$ red man became a part of the social make-up ·of 
every .frontiersman, and he passed it on to his children. Undoubtedly the 
callousness toward the Indians that was to characterize much of American 
policy in yea.rs to coin.e originated during this periodo 
This i& not to say that the frontiersman did not have his moral 
shortcomingso The set.tler oou.ld kill as indiscriminately and cru.elly as 
his Indian foeo To frontier shame, White mves of the Delaware and Old 
Tassell of the Cherokee as well ·as Corn Stalk of the Shaw;nee were all 
murdered while on their way to, or attending, peace conferences. The 
., 
wanton slaughter of one }µlndred Christian Indians in 1783 at afdenhutten 
-~ . . 
ranks in premeditated savagery along with any exploit tha:t the Indians 
19Ibido, 9941~999,J. 
20Ibid O ' 995 .. 
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could boa.st of. 
The year 1778 saw no rest for the frontier, only increased hardships. 
As early a.s January 20, John Harris wrote President "Wharton of Pennsyl-
vania., "I am of Oppinion that the Indians will take an active part next 
Spring ••• as their Young men don•t understand Acting as Neutrals in 
time of 'Warr " ., .. .. ,t21 He insisted that the war must be carried into 
the Indian country if the raids were to be stopped, sounding the first 
note of what would become a. full choras as the year wore on .. Rumors of 
coming disaster led the frontier to plan for the worst, but Vice Presi-
dent George Bryan of Pennsylvania advised them not to rely on the state 
to provide arms., It could spare.few, he said, since Congress made heavy 
demands on it for the Continental forees .. 22 
Finally General }land, who had been unable to provide any signifi= 
cant protection for the frontier in 1777, was ready to move .. In February~ 
1778, he led 500 militia to attack a newly established Indian supply base 
located on Lake Erie at the mouth of the Cuyahoga Rivero Heavy rainsi 
inadequate supplies and less than adequate leadership finally proved too 
much for the expedition, and it turned back to Fort Pitt .. All it had ao= 
complished was to kill a few friendly Delaware Indians .. 23 General Hand 
was disgraced by this "Squaw Cantpaign," as it was contemptuously called, 
and he requested transfer baek to the Contin~ntal .Army; in April he was 
relieved, Brigadier General Laehlen Mcintosh being sent to take coll'IDl.and of 
Fort Pitte 
2lle 
21 John Harris to Presidemt "Wharton, January 20t 1?78, E,Q !o 9 VII, 
22Vice President George Bryan (of' Pennsylvania) to Lt., Carothers, 
May 3, 1778 9 ibido, 467.468., 
23van Every, 132 ... 1330 
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Adding to the problem of hosti~e Indians at Fort Pitt was the in-
creasing belligerency of frontier loyalists. Colonel John Proctor re-
ported to Philadelphia in Ap:ril that Alexander McKee -- an inflaentia.l 
a.gent among the western tribes -- and "Sevin other Vilons" had declared 
their loyalty to the king and tled to live among the Indianso In ad-
dition, twenty soldiers had deserted at Fort Pitto "What may be the fate 
of this oo'llntey," he concl11ded, "God only knows, but at Present it wears 
a most Dismal a.specton24 Eve:r;r day brought the authorities at Phila-
delphia news of new hostilitieso In early May, Congress sent.240 rangers 
to bolster the Fort Pitt garrison,25 and later in 'the month, General 
Mcintosh arrived with the 13th Virginia. and 8th Pennsylvania. Continental 
regiments. 26 These were still too few troops to hope to patrol the border 
of the upper Ohio. Increasingly it was being urged that the frontier 
could not be guarded, a.nd that.a pu.nitive ,expedition mu.st go into the 
Indian oottntey if' the settlers·were to have any reliefe27 
On June ll, 1778 the Boa.rd of' War announced to Congress that an 
Indian war was imminent and that the Seneca, Cayaga., Mingo, Wyandotte, 
Onondaga., Ottawa, Chippewa, Shawnee and Delaware had so fallen under 
British influence that immediate steps must be takeno 28 The Board en-
dorsed an aggressive campaign and urged such an action to cow the tribes 
and capture Detroit.29 They called f'or an expedition or 4,000 men, 
24colo John Proctor to President Wharton, April 20, 1778, .f.. A,o, VI, 
445. 
25council to Lt. Samu.el Hunter, May 21, 1778, ibido, 537., 
26vice President Bryan to Lt. ·Samu.el Hunter, May 20, 1778~ ibido, 564 .. 
. 27couneil to President or Congress, May 19, 1778, ibido, 524; General 
Armstrong to Congress, 1778, ibid., 61'.3-614. 
28 i.• .Q.e Q. .. , .XI, 587. 
29 B Ibido, 5 Bo 
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suggesting an appropriation of.$932,742 1/3 to finance it. In addition, 
they- recommended that General ijoratio Gates be ordered to send a force 
into Senec~ e011ntry to punish that tribe and to captttre the British post 
at Oswegoo30 
Like many of Congress's decisions on Indian policy, this reeommenda-
tion came too lateo On May 30, Joseph Brant and his Iroquois warriors 
appeared in the Mohawk Valley, an area hitherto spared by the Iroquois 
barrier. It was a rich region and was an important bread basket for the 
Continental forceso Living off the country, Brant's warriors kept u.p a 
series of swift, erratic raids fQr two months, as they spread,desolation 
and a maximum of terror. By the end of June, even greater disaster over~ 
took the frontiero Leading a combined force Gf Iroq:uois and Tories, 
Colonel John Butler marched into the W.,oming Valley. On June 4, the 
principal stronghold of the valley, Forty Fort, surrendered, and the rich 
fanning co!l'Jlmlnity endured massacre and deva~tation that became a pa.rt of 
frontier folklore. A flood of immigrants fled to eastern Pennsylvania 
spreading terror and panic. Lt. Samu.el H\tnter, a militia commander re-
ported that hundreds were fleeing the Pennsylvania frontier and that 
"nothing but a firm reliance on Divine Providence and the Virtue of our 
neighbors induces the few to stand that remain. o o on31 William Maclay 
pleaded, "for God's sake, for the sake of the Country, let Lt. Httnter be 
reinforced at Slmbury, - ... send but astngle company if you oan°t do moreo 113~ 
But the frontier reoeived no aid. On July 12, Congress determined 
30Ibid., 589-590. 
31tt. Samuel Htmter to Commanders of Militia, July 9, 1778, P., A .. , 
VI, 631. - -
32Wllll 1 · 6 am Mac ay to COllnoil, J,uy 12, 1778, ibid., 340 
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that General Mcintosh's expedition against Detroit must be abandoned due 
to lateness of the season and the exorbitant cost of s,ppl.ies.33 The 
General was ordered to use such forces as he had gathered to strike the 
local Delaware towns. This expedition accomplished little except to es-
tablish the useless Fort Laurens, which only provided a convenient post 
for any passing Indians tc:> stop and attacko34 On Au.gust 22, the -Board 
of War also recommended that the expedition against the Seneca be called 
off for similar reasons and for fear of weakening the "Grand Army. 1135 
Washington approved this move, significantly explaining that frontier 
conditions were terrible "bt,lt they are evils of a partial nature wpich 
do not effect the general security, and consequently can only claim a 
secondary attention."36 On September 3, Congress approved the cancel-
lation of the Seneca mission and passed responsibility to General Washing-
ton, directing him tQ do whatever he could for the frontiero37 
Still the settlers' ordeal was not overo In September, the Brant-
Blltler forces nt!'thodioally destroyed German Flats, a J11.ajor patriot grana= 
ry. Even the first snows of winter did not stop the attacks. On November 
11, Walter Butler led a force down on Cherry Valley, and thus the frontier 
had another massacre to add to the list. 
Elsewhere, the year 1778 saw !'enewed attacks by the Shawnee on the 
Kentucky Stations and general unrest all along the southern frontiero 
VII, 
33:!,. g_ .. £•, XI, '720. 
34taohlen Mcintosh to V1ee President Bryan, December 29, 1778, .f .. !,o, 
132. 
35:!,. £• Q., XI, 829. 
36Washington Writings, m, 264. 
37 i, .. .Q. .. Q .. , XII, 868. 
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Congress found that "the present sit-.tion of the State of Georgia by 
reason of the .frequent inroads and depredations of the Floridans and 
Indians is truly alarming and render it absolutely necessary tor these-
curity ot the said state that the military forae raised for the. defense 
and support there0f. 'be kept and paid in Continental CUrreney.,n38 A mili-
tary chest ot $1,000 1000 was established, but the badly needed Conti-
nental troops were not forthcomingo 
The most daring and aggressive action of the war was in the Illinois 
country. George Rogers Clark persuaded the state or Virginia to support 
him in an attack on t.Qose distant pests north of the Ohio. With a small 
force, he reached Kaskaskia on July 4 and captured the fort from the 
startled British, who had no idea that .American forces were anywhere in 
the region. Cahokia and Vincennes soon capitulated with little resis-
•. 
tance.. By mid-August, Clark ocmtrolled the IDinois country and called a 
general council with the nieghboring Indians_ ... Miami, ottawa, Pota.watomi, 
Chippewa, Ojibwa, Kickapoo, Winnebago, Sauk and Fox -- where his arrogant 
and confident manner so impressed them that they swore allegiance to the 
United Stateso39 Hearing the news of this coup, Governor Henry Hamilton 
of Detroit immediately set out to redeem the country; on December 29, he 
recaptured Vincenneso On Febl"!4ary 24, 1779, however, Clark not only re-
gained Vincennes but took :a.a.ilton prisoner, an ac~on that brought joy to 
frontiersmen who believed the governor to be the source of their woeso 
Like pendu.lums swinging back a:nd forth, the tir:iy forces on each side 
J8Ibid., 938 .. 
39congress provided alm.o$t no assistance for any of George Rogers 
Clark's expeditionso Lack of material support to provide presents for 
the IDinois Indians hampered his negotiations with them. Patrick Henry 
in-: Council to G~orge Rogers Clark, December 12, 1778t Papers !!, James 
Madison, I, 2760 
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fought for control or the impor~nt Illinois region~ Again, as in the 
Cherokee War of 1776, significant achi,vements in Indian and western 
diplomacy were accomplished with no aid from Congress. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE WAR YEARS, ll 
••• when a powerful nation wiU descend to the low m.-
ployment ot an Incendiary; and plume herself on wasting 
a Country which she cannot subduer when she ean saorifioe 
her Glory to her Vengeance ••• 1s it to be wondered at 
that she should be suooesstttl. in Feats not beyond the 
Atchievement of the midnight Ruffian! 1 
. James !Mane to George Clinton 
Spring, 1779, seemed to offer no respite to the frontier, only a 
Q 
tragic repetition of the past two summers. In April, William Maclay re-
ported that the Indians had struck at Wyoming, Fort Jenkins, Fishing 
Creek, Freeman•.s Mill, Fort Maney and Loyal S.ock. He mourned that "the 
whole force of the Six Nations seems to be pouring down upon Us."2 
Warning that the spring crop had probably already been lost, he added his 
voice to the two~year-old litany declaring that only an expedition into 
the Indian country could. 0:tfer any salvation for the frontiersmeno3 
At last such an offensive oampaign was in store. Two factors favored 
an operation into Indian country in the smnmer of 1779 .. First, the 
western war was beginni.ng to affect directly the war on the seaboard .. The 
inroads made into the productive New York and Pennsylvania valleys mu.st 
be stopped if adequate supplies for the Continental Forces were to be 
lJames Dnane to the Governor or New York (George Clinton), November 
lJ+, '1780, l!,o QQ .Q.•, V, 444. 
2Wiiliam Maclay to the Council, April 27, 1779, ,f. ! .. , VII, 357 .. 
)Ibid. 
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maintained. Seoond, there was no indication or a return of the French 
fleet from the West Indies, and the Continental army could not engage the 
British in New Yo~k without their assistance.· Rather than remain idle, 
part or that army might now be used against the Indians. In addition, 
General Washington suggested political pressure tor the eampaign when h~ 
later explained I 
The motives to the undertaking, besides the real importance 
of rescuing the frontier from . the alarms, ravages and d;i.s ... 
tresses to which it was eJC;pOSed; and which in ail probability 
wo,µd have redoubled this year, were the increasing clamours. 
of the eount:r;y and the repeated applications o~ the States 
immediately concerned, supported by ft"equent references an~ ' 
.indications of' the pleasure or Congress.· The combined force 
ot these motives appeared ~o,me to leave·nQ alter:native.4 
In Febru.a:ry, Congress 9rdered,General Washington to begin prepara-
tions for a punitive campaign •. Even before this authorization, the 
General had been writing to gather inf'ormation concerning routes to be 
taken, strength of the Indian tribes and related matterso.5 ,In March, he 
. ottered the command or the expedition to General Horatio "Gates; when he 
· declined, Major General John Sullivan w:a.s chosen ... 6 The overall plan was 
' .. 
to divide the army into two w.i~gs: one to march .from a ba.se in New York, 
the ~ther from a Pennsylvania site, and bo~h to join at Tioga.for an as-
sault on·the Iroquois country • .,At the same time, Colonel Daniel Brodh~ad, 
the n!!)w commander o.f Fort pj,. tt',, was to march north f'r'om his post to at!"' 
. . 
· tack the Mingo · and Seneca towns ori1 -the ~pper Allegheny:. In, this way, the 
.Il!'oquois would be stnck fro~ 'all sides. Genel"al Su11ivan was instructed 
·. 4,~t:>rge Wa~~ngwn to ~eside~t of Congress, Augt1st 15, 1779,- Washing ... 
12!l Wr1 tings, Vl'., 107. 
. 5 ' ' -
. · . · i.rwo .~ch le.tters were, George Washington to . Brigadier General 
Lachlan.Meintosh, January '.31, 1779, washirfton Writi;s, XIV, 62; George 
Washingto~· to General Schuyler, Febl"l1ary , l7?9, Fd., 94-950 .. The 
Rev~rendSamuel Xirkland, J~es Deane and General Wadsworth were also 
· wr1 tten. , · 
60eorge washingtc,n to General Horatio Gates, Marcli 6, 1779, ibid., 2000 
that "the Immediate objects are the total destl'llotion and devastation or 
their ffe.e IroqyJ.oiif settlements and the capture or as many- prisoners of 
every sex as possible."? This treatment, it was hoped,. would pry the 
Indians .from their British alliance; their destruction was to be com-
plete because "our f'llture security will be in their inability to injure 
us • • • • " 
8 
A well provisioned force of 4,000 men was massed. General SUllivan 
led three brigades commanded by Brigadier Generals Edward Hand, Enoch 
Poor and William Maxwell; the second arm was the brigade commanded by-
Brigadier General James Clinton. In addition, Virginia and Pennsylvania 
were requested to provide state mil:iM.ao On June 18, 1779, Sllllivan be-
gan his march, reaching Tioga by- Au.gust 10. On August 2~, Clinton's amy-
joined him, and on August 26, they led their combined might into the Iro-
quois country-o The Confederacy wa.s'ttnprepared to meet this force, and the 
army cut its way through the oo'llntry with considerable ease. Only once 
were they met in actual battle; at Newtown mn August 29, Brant and Butler 
9 tried to stop the army, but were defeated in a short battle., By Septeill-
ber 30, the a:rmy had regained Tioga, and on Oetober 15, the forces had 
reached their return base at Easton, Pennsylvania., It appeared to be a 
tota.l.ly suecessf'ul, if not spectacular, eampaigno Forty Iroquois towns 
and a corn crop amounting to an estimated 16o,OOO bu.shels had been de ... 
stroyed with a total loss of only forty Continental soldiersolO This was 
7Instl'tlotions to Major General John SUlliva.n, May 31, 1779, ibido, 
xv, 189. 
8 Ibid., 192. 
9oeneral Orders, September 10, 1779, ibido, XVI, 259. 
10 General Orders, Oetober 17, 1779, ibido, 4780 
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a harsh bln to the relatively civilized Six Nations. Iroquois towns .were 
built ot su.'bstaJ1tial log buildings, and they had been tilled with the 
harvest of the Indians•· fields and orchards and domestic animals when 
Sullivan's soldiers burned themo In addition, Colonel Brodhead had set 
out on August 11 with 600 men and gone some 180 miles up the .Allegheny, 
destroying all.the Seneca towns in th.at regiono He met only token re-
, .· .. 11 
sis~ee and carried out his assig~e.nt without the loss of' a mane 
General Washington gloated that the British had allowed. their faith~ 
ful allies the Iroquois to be·destroyed by a force altogether inferior t0 
their owno12 He and General Schuyler expected th~ Indians to sue for 
peace, and 'Washington wondered if' an attack on Niagara could be made a 
condi't,ion to granting it.13 Finally, it appea:rred, Congress was in comand 
of the frontier, and peace was to be restored. 
In the winter of 1779 and the spring of 1780, setUers flooded westo 
Based on a belief that General SUllivan•s expedition had ended the f'ron~ 
tier war, new settJ.ements sprang up all ,along the bordero Frontiersmen 
and Congress alike were to suffer a ru.de awakeninge The splendid suc-
cesses of General SUllivan s~on became hollow vioto:tieso Destruction of 
their towns proved a hardship to the Iroqa.C!>is during the wint~r, but tld:,s 
only drove them oloser to the British, who provided them sustenenoe during 
that seasono By June, James Madison had to report to his fri~nd Thomas 
Jefferson: 
It. appears from sundry accounts from the Frontiers of N.Yo 
and other No States, that the Savages are making the most 
distressing ineursions ·Under the direction of British 
11George Wa111hington to General Horatio Gates, October 16, 1779, ibido, 
472. 
l2George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, October 17, 1779, ibido, 
XVII, 24. 
l3~o6rge Washington to General Philip Schuyler, January 30, 1780, ibid. t 46 0 
agents •••• It is possible the Enemy will be QBt too 
suocesstul.this campaign in exciting their vindictive 
spirit against us th?'Gughout the whole frontier of the 
United states. The expeditien: of Genl. SUllivan agnst. 
the six nations seems 'by' its effeot rather to have ,x-
asperated than to have terrified or disabled them..l~ 
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In fact, the New York .frontier had been attacked as early as Febrt1-
ary, when the vengenoe""'.~eeking warriors made an unprecedented march on 
snow shoes .. 15 In April, Joseph Brant returned to strike at Harpersfield, 
Ulster, Cherry Valley, and Minisink: .. In August, Brant punished the Oneida 
.for their loyalty to the United States. In October, Major Guy Carlton 
produced justified alarm as far east as Schneotady and Albany with his 
raiding part;ro At the same time, Sir John Johnson and Brant combined 
forces and ravaged the Schoharie Valley.16 In answer to demands from the 
New York Assembly that he send troops to save their ravaged frontier, 
General Washington could only answer that Congress had approved a reso-
lution calling .for the state to raise 800 militia for its defense, and 
that he was sure the Assembly would take so wise a step .. 17 As winter be-
gan, the Indian and Tory forces began to ~thdraw to Niagarat Detroit and 
Oswego,., burning and killing as they went. 
The same unhappy rate awaited the Pennsylvania frontier. In March, 
the first news of raids began to trickle into Ph.j,ladelphiao18 In addition 
14James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, June 2, 1780, ~o .Q_ .. .Q. .. , V, 181 .. 
15.A.gain, the Indians N9re striking valleys significant for their 
productivity; James Madison estimated that the Schoharie alone produced 
8,000 b11shels_.of wheat.yearly. James Madison to Joseph Jones, November 
14, 1780, Papers !!, James .)fa,dison, II, 4;.. . 
. .. 16George washington to Governor George Clinton, April 12, 1780, 
Washington Writings, XVIII, 253 ... 254 .. 
17Ibid., 
18Extraot of a letter from John Hackencalder; March 30, 1780,. P .. A .. , 
- -
·VIII, 1520 
to the Indians, the frontier commanders caplained about the loyalists on 
the border who assisted and :tou.ght with the Iadians. "This is a strange 
divided Qr.tarter -- tildg, Tory, Yankey, Pennandte Dtlteh, Irish and English 
i:nfluenees are .strangely blendec:ili:" observed Wllliam Maelayo19 
Frontiersmen and Congress hoped that Colonel Brodhead might lead an 
attack ·from Fort Pitt on Detroit 'which, if su:ceess:f'tll., would remove an 
important center of British inf'luenee and badly damage their prestigeo 
Holding Fort Pitt itself was, hewever, about the limit of BN>dhead0 s 
ability. He vainly att8lllpted to plan a ne,roit eampaign,but found that 
he was unable to pernade local militiamen to guard the Ohio forts while 
the Continental regulars moved into the interior; it was a distressing,. 
but perhaps not incomprehensible, example of frontier provincialism. 
It is doubtful whether .Brodhead could have in fact carried out such 
a campaign if the mili t1$lllen had coope:ra. ted. Both Pennsylvania and Vir-
ginia, the sources of Stlpply for Fort Pitt, were in :financial straits re-
sulting from the long war years and depreciated Continental ourrencyo In 
August, Colonel Brodhead wrote President Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania that 
the garrison had been without bread for several days and that the troops 
were beginning to "mttrmur"; he added that he had been forced to close the 
small supporting torts for lack of supplieso20 In September he report~d 
to Philadelphia that the Congressional Bo~rd of W~r had instructed him to 
rely on commissioners appointed by Virginia and Pennsylvania to supply his 
troops, but that Pennsylvania had appointed only one such commissioner and 
Virginia none at all .. 21 He dourly andmenacingly concluded, "I sincerely 
19Wlllia.m Maclay to President Joseph Reed (of Pennsylvania), April 
2, 1780, ibido, 1560 
20 Daniel .Brodhead to President Reed, Augast 18, 1780, ibido, .514 .. 
21Daniel Brodhead to President Reed, September 5, 1780, ibide, 5360 
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wish your Excellency may interest yourself in our favor, for unless some-
thing is speedily done, these posts which are of the utmost importance, 
must be evacuated and the Country will of course be deserted or as some 
have hinted, join the Enemy."22 
The state of Virginia had also planned its own attack on Detroit to 
relieve the f'rontier4 George Ro'gers Clark was to lead the foree, and 
George Washington ordered Colonel Brodhead to supply Clark all the aid he 
could spareo23 The jealouay of Brodhead and the parochialism of the 
Kentucky and Virginia frontiersmen, who simply refused to volunteer to 
fight for such a distant objective, killed all hope of the expeditiono 
Clark then turned his energies to building Fort Jefferson at the mouth of 
the Ohio, a poor alternativeo 
Clark was more successful in the minois country, where he was soon 
called to turnbaok a British-Indian force out of Mackinac led by E)nanu.el 
Hesseo At the same time~ Captain Henry Bird, le~ding a force of Indians 
from Detroit, was attacking Ke,ntuolcy'a Using cannon, he forced Riddle's 
Station to capitulate on June 20, the first Kentucky Statio.n ever to 
surrender., George Rogers Clark rushed baek to Kentucky too late to do 
battle 1'.dth Bird, who returned to Detroit with over one hundred prisoners~ 
but he did form the frontiersmen, now more willing to fight, into an eX= 
pedition directed against the Seneca .. This force burned· the Seneca towns 
of Chillicothe and Piqua, t];J.us freeing Kentucky from at"'tac:k for the re= 
mainder of the yearo 
Only in the south was the news goodo The Cherokees had begun to 
22 Ibido, 5370 
23George Washington to Governor Thomas Jefferson, December 28, 1780, 
WashiMton Writings, XX, 23-24 .. 
51 
attack the frontier again. In. autumn, 1?80, Colonel Arthur Campbell ot 
Virginia and Colonel John Sevier, the leader of the Watauga settlements, 
led a retaliatory force that destroyed the towns of the Overhill Chero~ 
kee, leaving them homeless and without food for the coming wintero In 
the Spring of 1781, Sevier returned with another force and destroyed the 
Middle towns, forcing that faction of the Cherokee nation to sign the 
second Treaty of Long Island, surrendering further landso 
Although Lord Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown on October 19, 1781, 
virtually ended the organized war on the seaboard, the frontier war raged 
on until 1782., These two years saw only a repetition of the dismal fate 
that had been the frontier's since 1776. An impotent Congress, hampered 
by the chaotic state of Continental finances, now almost abdicated all 
responsibility for the westo The Indians fell regalarly on the New York 
border, but General Washington repeatedly told New York state officials 
that they must not rely on him for any a.id, though "I entreat your Ex... 
cellency [Governor Clintoi{ to assure the Assembly, that it is impossible 
to feel more than I do for the distresses of the state a ., • on24 He was 
also at pains to remind the governor that "as an officer interested in 
the general interest of the Confederacyn25 he could view New York border 
attacks as only one part of a larger stru.ggleo In May, Fort Schuyler 
(Fort Stanwix, patriotically renamed), an important post in northwest New 
York that had served as the farthest point of American control iri that 
area throughout the war, had to be abandoned and its forces drawn back to 
German Flats because of scarcity of supplieso26 The New York frontier was 
240eorge Washington to Governor George Clintont Febru.ary 14, 1781, 
ibid., XXI, 288G 
25Ibido, 2870 
26Geol:"ge Washington to President of Congress, May 27, 1781, ibido, 
XXII, 1210 
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almost a desert when, in late 1781, the state finally raised a force of 
local militia under Colonel Mari.nus Wlllet. They drove the Indians fr(l)Dl 
the Mohawk Valley, intlioting a severe defeat on them a:t West Canada. 
Creeko 
In the upper Ohio f)ountry, the Dela.ware, Shawnee ud Wyandotte 
stru.ck with rene'Wed fury, and· Congress was unable to bring any order ou.t 
of the contusion. Colonel Brodhead, the principal officer in the area, 
was eourt-martialed for irregular1,ties ;in his command, whereupon his 
successor at Fort Pitt, Brig,dier General William Irvine, even suggested 
abandoning that essential post and retreating to Ohartier•s Creek. 27 The 
Boa.rd of War a.rmou,nced that Fort Pitt, in fact, might have to be closed 
if essential su.pplies were not found; they reported that the soldiers were 
reduced to hunting buffalo to feed the ga.rrison.28 · In two years, 1781-
1782, the post was able to support only one major campaign, that against 
the Seneca towns on the Sandusky. Far from being;suecess:f'tll., this force, 
under the command of Colonel William Crawford, was defeated, over half of 
the men being captured anq tortured to de.a th by the Indianso 29 
When peace finally came to the west in 1782, American fortunes on 
the frontier were at a nadir •. .Almost all the Indians were in the enemy 
ranks, the Illinois cou.ntry had apparently been lost when Virginia with-
drew her troops in 178130 and the Eritish still held the vital posts at 
27George Washington to Brig~dier General William Irvine, December 18, 
1781, ibid., mn, 396. 
28i, • .£• g., XIX, 4ll. 
29oeorge. Washington .. to Brigadier General William Irvine, July 10, 
1782, Washington Writi!?Ss, mv, 417. 
'.30Wh.ether this constituted an abandonment or not, and as to its ef ... 
feqts on boundary negotiations in Paris in 178'.3, disagreement existso One 
scholar says that George Rogers Clark's activity in Illinois country 
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Detroit, Niagara, Oswego, and Maokinao. Although tne British were regu-
larly successful in persuading the Indians to f'ight for and with them, 
the Amerieans had failed almost totally in their effort to enlist warrior-
soldiers. After the Cane.dian defeat, Congress had quickly repented its 
policy of neutrality and found "that it is highly expedient to engage 
Indians in the service c,f the Unit~d Oolonieso•31 In addition, the 
Northern commissioners were to urge the Indians of that department to at-
taok Niagara, while the Middle commissioners were to C!>rgani.ze an Indian 
assault on Detroito32 The optimistic Congressmen even ap~oved a force 
of 2,000 Indians for use in Canada.33 SU.oh disregard for the fact of 
growing Indiu defection must have am.a.zed Philip Schuyler, who eould only 
reply, "so far from. being able to procure t"WO thousand Indians to join us, 
I shall be extremely happy if we can preven,t them from acting against us 
0 • •• .,'4 In 1778, at the height of the attacks, Congress again approved 
really only weakened the hold or the mother country on a small corner of 
the disputed territory" and that "the basis for the success of American 
diplomacy had b>een laid not by the victory of the arms of Virginia, not 
thrQu.gh the boldness of George Rog'ers Clark ••• 'but in the liberal 
principles held by a British statesman 'Ltord ShelburniJo" Clarence Wo 
ilvord,."Virginia and the West: an niterpretation," Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, m (June, 1916), 19-38. On the other hand, there is 
ev!denee th.a! Cl.ark was still.in control of the nlinois country at the 
end or 1782 and that the negQtiators in Paris knew of this; see, James 
.Alton James, "Tc> What Extent was George Rogers Clark in M:ilit~ry Control 
of . the. Northwest .. at the ClQs,e .of'. the .American Revolution," .American His,., 
· torical Association Arlnual Rettrt, (1917), '.315-329; James Afion Jame's;'*" 
Dln Appra!sa1 of.Mie.Cont:nSu~ons.of George Rogers Clark to the History 
of the West," MississiFi Valley R1storio.al Review, XVII (June, 1930), 98-
115; Le'Wis Jo Carey(e .. and trans.),."Fr~ Informed of Clark0s 
.Activities in the Old Northwest," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
XII (December, 1934), 375-378. 
31 Jo c. Oo, IV, 396. 
- - -
32Ibido 
33 1,· ' Ibid., ... 12. 
4 3 !_ .. !o, 4th Ser .. , VI, 795 .. 
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of enlisting Indians;:35 such actions indicated only- a total ignorance or 
disregard for the state ot Indian affairs. 
Why- had the .Americans lost the support of the Indians? A number of 
reasons can be giveno The British skil1:f'u.lly- played on the theme that 
the .Americans were only interested in possessing Indian landso In the 
first years of the war, the Continental Congress aotual1y- had no ex-
pansion policy, but land-hungry settlers seemed to prove the British 
charge only too wello This obvious grievance of the Indians was beyond 
repair by a Congress that had no physical control over the encroaching 
settlerso The British, on the other hand, could point to the Proclama-
tion of 1763 and the cessions of Forts Stanwix and Lochaber as examples 
of their recognition of the Indian claim to the soilo 
Equally important was the superior ability of the British to supply 
goods and presents to the Indianso As the war progressed, Congress was 
increasingly unable to meet even the minimal demands of the red men, and 
the states could do littJ.e better. William Henry Drayton had warned 9 
early in the war, "experience has taught us that occasional presents t(!)I 
the Indians has been the great means of acquiring their friendshipo"36 
George Washington complained that he had no hope of getting Indians to 
join the army so long as the British could better reward themo37 James 
. 
Duane, the knowledgeable interpreter in the Northern Departmentj saw war 
with the red men as an alternative to presents; he advised, "these mis= 
guided Nations must Feel the Power of the United States, since we have 
3.50eorge. Wa.shing,ton to Commissioners of Indian Affairs, March 13 j 
1778, Washington Writings, x;I, 760 
36nrayton, II, 108. 
37George Washington to President of Congress, May 3, 1778, washing .. 
~ Writings, XII, '.3430 
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not the means of preserving their Fidelity hy ou.r Bounty. 0 0 • 1138 
Colonel Daniel Brodhead summed up the plight of the Middle Department 
when he reported, perhaps with a little sarcasm, "If the Friendship of 
the Delaware Indians is thought to be val-q.able, it is time that goods 
should be forwarded to clothe them before winter, otherwise they will be 
compelled to go where they can be suppliedo"'.39 More often, the goods 
were not forthcoming, and the Indians.did go elsewhere. 
Another reason for the Indian allegiance to Britain was the high 
quality of personnel i~ the British Indian departmento Besides the 
legacy of good relations bequeathed by Sir William Johnson and John 
Stuart, the British maintained a full complement of agents in the wartime 
departmento Joseph Brant, William and John Butler, William Grogan, 
Alexander Cameron, Henry Hamilton, and Sir John and Guy Johnson are only 
the better known of the British agents who worked among the Indians during 
the waro At one time there appear to have been as many as fifty officials 
in the northern superintendency who devoted all or part of their time to 
securing Indian allegianeeo40 The Americans had nothing to match this 
wealtho Perhaps the most effective of the Continental agents was the 
Reverend Samu.el Kil'lkland, missionary to the Oneida and Tusoarorao F.arly 
in the war, Washington testified, "I cannot bat intimate my Sense of the 
Importance of his Liirkland•§]" StatiQn and the great Advantages which have 
and may result to the United Colonies from his Situation being made re= 
.specta.bleo All the accounts agree that much of the favorable Disposition 
38James Duane to.President of Congress, January 129 1778j Lo Co Cot 
III, 280 . - - -
39na.n:iel Brodhead to President Reed, September 16, 1780~ .fo !o, IX, 
5590 
40walter Ho Mohr, Federal Indians Relations~ 1774=1788 (Philadelphiag 
University of Pennsylvan:ia,Press, i933)~ 420 
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shown by- the Indians may be ascribed to his Labor and Wluence • ..41 
Throughout the war, the Oneida and Ttiscarora l"em&ined peaee:f'lll, even when. 
attacked by Brant for their stand. Besides the Reverend Mr. IC1rkland, 
there was James Deane, interpreter i:n th.e Northern Department, and George 
Morgan, agent in the Middle Department, but this exhausts the list. 
Among the Congressional CCi>lllDJ.issioners, ,Philip Schuyler appears to be the 
only one who was enthusiastic and forcef'ul in his office, and he was 
saddled with many othe?'dtttieso Considering her ether disadvantages, 
America had real need for aggressive.and inventive personalities in her 
Indian department; instead mediocre ~etionaries provided erratic and 
desultory leadership. 
A final element or weakness was the conf'tl.sion as to where au~ority 
for initiating western and Indian.policy lay, and the conoomitant con-
fusion as to what the policy was. Until 1779 the source or policy seems 
to have been lodged in the periodically elected Standing Committees on 
Indian Affairso However, these committees regularly consu.lted .General 
Washington,·who seems to have considered the frontier an integral part of 
his commando After 1779, no evidence exists that Congress even bothered 
to appoint Standing Committees for Indian affairs, and their h.netion was. 
taken.ove;t> by the Board or War; again, th.ts Boa.rd leaned heavily on 
Washington to help them formulate the little consistent policy that ap,., 
pears in the war yearso This reliance was unfortunate for the frontier, 
for Washington.seems to have considered the western war of only secondary 
importance, a mat.ter to be left to the states aJ')d the frontiersmen them ... 
a.elves as much as possibleo The .General steadfas\lr· re:f'Used to weaken 
41aeorge_:\il.sbington to President of Congress, September JO, 1775, 
Washington Writ!Pgs, III, 5260 
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the Continental army to provide trained troops so necessary for success-
ful western operations. He approved the expedition in 1779 because the 
frontier activities were beginning to impinge on his seaboard activity. 
Washington's general polioy was not necessarily a blunder, for he had 
neither the men or supplies to wage a two-front war, but it was an un-
fortunate necessity for the westG 
Besides committees, boards and generals, there were the Congression= 
al commissioners; they sometimes awoke from their lethargy to appoint 
regional agents who went very much their own way, ,neither seeking or 
following any over-all policy. Added to this national level of Indian 
management was the equally important state level,., State a.gents and com-
missioners were often the most active men of influence among the tribes, 
eaoh striving to foster the individual interests of his own stateo 
All of these defects combined to leave the west open to years of 
devastation and haJ'dship. Yet no fundamental solutions emerged from the 
conflict in the west. Basic questions of Indian policy remained un-
answered at the end of the war, leaving a residue of new problems with 
which the post...war Congresses had to contendo 
CHAP!'ER V 
YEARS OF· PEACE: 178'.3-1?88 
As to orginating the Indian war, so far from being 
originated by Great Britain, I know that it originated 
in the raise policy of Congress in 178'.3; I foretold it 
then with all of its cons.equences. 
Elias Boudinot, President 
Continenta1 Congress, 178?-178'.31 
The Treaty of Paris set the western boundary of the United States at 
the Mississippi River, ceding the nation a great unsetUed western empire. 
This cession set squarely on the Congress the perennia1 problems of how 
to treat with the Indians and then peacef'ully remove them from the area, 
how to dispose or the lands in an orderly and profitable manner, and how 
. 2 to govern the settl.ers who wel'e straining to flood in. At the same time 
Congress was confronted with a multii,ude of eonfiicting west'ern claims by 
the individua1 states. Wi.th the dangers or the war removed, these states 
were displaying an increasingly overt spirit or rear and jea1ousy towards 
the Congress and their sister states. 
Following the British and wa~time traditions, the states seemed 
'..i. -
agreed that the naticnwl. government should have some voice in 
lMohr, l0'.3. 
2Prospects or peace increased the continuing fiow westward. In· 
October, 1782 the commanding officer at Fort Pitt reported "the people 
are in great numbers flocking over the Ohio into what has hitherto been 
called Indian country and ar,e busy in taking up and improving lands as 
well on what is supposed to be within the bounds of Pennsylvania as be-
yond the western line thereof." Brigadier Genera1 William Irvine to 
Secretary at Wl.r (Benjamin Lincoln), October 28, 1782, L. c. c., VI, .542 
n2o - - -
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the direction ot Indian atfai:i,s. Dl2ring the war years they had been 
willing to give, Congress a fairly free ~and •. Few instances o:r eonf'liet 
' 
had appeared, pdss::1.'blybecause Congress was never able to take a f'irm. grip 
on Indian af'f'airs, and that which later might appear state interference in 
the Indian Department was accepted as state assistance. ;Besides this, 
Congress obtained no general cessions of lands during the war, and the 
core of conflicts and jealousy centered about the states• western pre-
tensions. 
As early as 1775 Benjamin Franklin, in his suggested plan or govern-
ment, had reserved certain aspects of Indian.~nagement to a central 
colonial government.3 Article :X: pl"Ovided that no colony was to engage 
in any offensive war with any natipn or Indians without consent of 
Congress. Article XI planned a national offensive and defensive alliance 
with the Six Nations; thi·s su.ggests that national supervision might re"i' 
place that of New York and Pennsylvania over this most important con-
federation. Boundaries would be establis'hed to protect the Indians, alld 
no encroachments permitted. Quite important was the Franklin regalation 
that forbade private or colonial land purchases. Land transfers coul.d be 
arranged only between Congress and general councils of the Indians. 
4 In John Diekinson•s first draft of the ~oles of Confederation, 
these provisions were generally ad~pted, though the prohibition against 
private or colonial land purchases was i:set in abeyance until the exact 
limits of' the colonies could be ascertai_ned. The Dickinson draft spelled 
out specifically what .~lin•s plan suggested:exelusive ·right to regu ... 
late trade and manage the affairs or the Indians was given to Congress. 
3:!_ • .Q. .. ·£., II, 195-199 .. 
4:rbido, V, 546..,554. 
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In the final dra£t,5 which became operative en March 1, 1781, only the 
provision giving Congress the right to regulate trade and manage Indian 
affairs was retained; this was limited by a warning to the effect that 
the legislative right of any state within its own boundaries was not to 
be infringed. 
As peaoe slowly returned to the frontier and the question of western 
lands became more prominent, the o(!)DUllitm,ent of the states to national su"" 
premaoy in Indian affairs became more and mere tenuouso As early as 1778 
James Duane, loyal son of New York, had refused an appointment as Indian 
commissioner because: 
••• the Jurisdiction of tb;is State over the Country of the 
Six Nations is unquestionable as well as anciento On it 
depends the legality of all our settlers in the Mohawk 
Country o Apprehension that the interference of Congress 
might one time or other cross the rights of the Interests 
of the State, and that as a Tru.stee for Congress I might 
be embarrassed and restrained in supporting our separate 
and exolusive6Jurisdiction, I did not see my way olear to 
engage in ito 
The farseeing Mro D!lane was right, for the days of oonfliot over the 
Iroquois country were not far off. 
To understand the continued hesitancy and seeming neglect with which 
Congress handled Indian affairs in the 1783-1788 period, it must be re-
membered that both the increased responsibility for the west and the 
growing opposition from the states ca.me at a time when Congress was least 
able to face themo The Continent'1, Congress was never a ~orisistently 
. J 
strong institution and, as if exhausted from the effort, it lapsed into 
Q 
real lethargy and weakness after the waro Faced with the natienal spirit 
. 5R1ehard Peters (ed .. ), Publie·Statutes .!!. Lar!e (Bostons Charles C .. 
Little and James Brown, 1848), I, 4:9 o • 
6Ja.mes Duane to Governor of New York (George Clinton), March 13, 
1778, &o Qo Q. .. , III, 1290 
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o:t disunity that peace brought, the overwhelming financial problems, and 
chronic absenteeism, the accomplishments o:t Congress came slowly and 
painf't1lly. On June 21, 1783 the United States in Congress Assam.bled-~ 
' l 
as Congress styled itself after the Articles went into effect ...... was 
actually forced to leave Philadelphia by mutinous soldiers demanding back 
pay. The Congressmen traveled to Princeton, insulted and indignant, but 
imp<!)tentG In that small college town things were no bettero "We have 
Done LitleBussiness since we Came to this place haveing often but Six 
states represented and indeed we Can do but Litle at such a Distance from 
the Publiok offices. they being all at .Philad'a and will Continue there," 
reported John Montgome:i,y.7 Widespread pessismism existed abou.t Con-
gressional ability to pull itself together. Richard Peters expressed re-
lief to have vacated his seat and declared "I am much the happiest when 
I hear or think nothing of the erratic meteor which rose with so :ma.oh 
splendo:'" and I fear will set with no small disgrace .. "8 Waxing classical, 
he compared America to Antaeus, who was invigorated by a fall in which he 
. 
touched mother earth;.' he explained, "if this could be the case with our 
permanently wanderi:gg Giant the sooner he is at the lowest the bettero 119 
In the same vein, Elias Boudinot complained, "the President is to adjourn 
Congress on the 12th Novr. to Anna.poliso So that we are to be in the 
future wandering Stars p ., • I augu,r great evil from this measure and 
cannot help thinking or Rome and Censtantinopleo"lO 
Although the western war had largely ended in 1782, isolated attaeks 
·7John Montgomery- to William Irvine~ July 26, 178), ibido, VII, 2350 
8R:1.chard Peters to Charles Thomson, October 20, 1783, ibid.,, 3430 
9Ibid.,, J4Jl.e 
lOElias Boudinot to Robert R. Livingston, October 23, 1783, ibido, 
347. 
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11 
continued along the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontier. The British 
had_assured 'Washington that they were working t<!> keep the tribes peace-
ful, but he doubted the COlllplete faithtulness of this assertion. 12 
Congress had taken no steps towards consolidating their viot<:>ry over 
Britain among the tribes, and this is but one ,xample of their diminish-
ing ability to handle national affairs. General 'Washington and Philip 
Schuyler, tw<:> men who had been among the most influential in the Indian 
Department during the war, felt that Congress should act quickly to profit 
from the British defeat.13 President Dickinson urged the Pennsylvania 
delegates in Congress to impress upon their colleagues the'necessity for 
action.14 
Finally Congress was ready to move. In April, 1783, a restructuring 
of the Indian Department occurred, a1though it seemed prineipally to 
recognize changes a1ready :ma.de. A committee composed of Alexander Hamil-
tan, James Madison, Samuel Osgood, Oliver Ellsworth and James Wilson 
recommended that the "general superintendanoe of Indian affairs under 
Congress be annexed to the Department of War • ..l.5 Since 1779 the Board of 
War had been directing Indian affairs, and ~his change only recognized 
the situa~ion. A slight change of structure was also suggested.. Four 
"agents•• ':""" "commissioners" was written but marked out ...... were to be 
11Lt. John Otllrm4ngs to President John Dickinson (of Pennsylvania), 
March 29, 1783, P.; A. X, 22. . 
- - : 
12 . . George Washington to Sir Guy- Carlton, September 8, 1782, Washing-
~ Writings, XXV, 138. 
13George Washington to Philip Schuyler, Ootqber 2, 1782, ibid., 2300 
14 President Dickinson to Delegates in Congress, April 4, 1783, .fo !,,, 
X, 25. 
l\!,o £. .. ,g_., XXIV, 264. 
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appointed for the_old Northern, M.idc;Ue and Southern departments -- now 
called districts -- and a new one was added, an Eastern District for all 
Indians under the general denomination of Penobscot.16 Finally, the com-
mittee urged Congress to send agents to the tribes to tell them of the 
peace and to declare that all hostilities by .American citizens would 
cease .. 
On May 1, 1783, again at the urging of Pennsylvania,17 Congress 
au.thorized the Secretary of War to take the most effectual means to in= 
form the Indians of the provisional peace treaty and the impending British 
evaou.ation of the Northwest postsl8 -- wishful thinking on the part of the 
Congressmen .. The agents were to suggest that the United States was in-
clined towards peace, but also to "inform the hostile Indian nations that 
-1 
unless they immediately cease all hostilities against the citizens of 
these United States, and accept these friendly offers of peace, Congress 
will take the most decided measures to compel them theretoo"l9 
Secretary Lincoln sent John Joseph Bull, Ebenezer Allen and Ephraim 
Dc;,uglass20 to deliver these messages .. ~U:glass, mssenger to the important 
l6rn fact, throughout the war years John Allen had worked among the 
Indians in the Maine-Nova Scotia areao He was appointed an Indian agent 
by Massachusetts, and carried on extensive correspondence with the Con-
tinental Congress ... His activities are recorded in Frederick Kidder (edo) 9 
Milita.ry.Operations"~ Eastern Maine.and !2!!,Scotia.During the.Revolution 
Chiefly Com1li~a from t'.6.e Journals· and Letters· .2!, Qs?.! .. John Allen (ilbanyi 
Joel Munsei, 18~ . 
l?President Dickinson wrote the delegates that at lea.st forty citi-
zens had be.en killed in spring raids, and he repeated his opinion that 
muoh would be solved if Congress foroe:f'u.lly told the Indians of their 
victory., President Diek;inson to Delegate,s in Congress, April 29, 1783, 
j!. !,e, X, 45.. -
18 
.:l.~ £• £ .. , XXIV, 219. 
l9Ibido, 319-320 .. 
20Randolph C .. Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio (Pittsburgha 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1940h 280: - - · 
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posts at Detroit and Niagara, sent baek a report whieh was less than en-
eouraging.21 He went to the Delaware v:1,llages on the Sandusky, hop:i,.ng 
to eall a general eonf'erenee of the Indians there. Intermed that Sir 
John Joh~son had called a general meeting for the same time at I)etroit 
and that all the Indians wou.l.d give this meeting precedence, he went on 
to Detroit. Colonel DePeyster, the commander of the post, received him 
courteously, but would not allo"th:J,m to tell the Indians anything beyond 
the fact that the British and Americans were no longer at war. This re-
, 
fusal was based on lack .or instru.etions from the royal governmento Pro ... 
hibited from carrying out his instrilet~ons there, Douglass went on to 
Niagara. Reao:hing that post on JulT 11, 1783, he had no better success .. 
General Maclean wmu.d not let him call the Indians together even when he 
promised to delet.e from the message anything that might be offensive to 
the.British, though the commander promised that he would keep the Indians 
j 
peaceful.a Although his mi"ssion had thus accomplished little, Douglass 
was able to report that the red men seemed tully tired of war and dis ... 
posed to peaoe. 
The Indians were only half of the frontier problem, however, f'or on 
August 12 Congress attempted tc, deal with the other troublesome sector, 
the settlers .. Aware of the westward mffement, the tollowil).g proclamation 
was issued: 
RESOLVEP, That all persons of' whatever description be 
strictly enjoined against making purchases of or 
settlements an lands claimed by Indians or receiving any· 
cession or gifts of lands ~rom any nation· ot Indians 
situate and being without ·the bounds or any particular .. 
state till the :further order ot Congress shall be lmown .. 22 
21The ~ report is found in, Report of Ephraim Deuglass to the 
Secretary at War, August 18, 1783, ?• !· ,. X, 8'.3-90. 
22 l• .Q. .. Q•, XXIV, 503. 
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These were the pre~iminaries; the question of a peaoe-time,Indian 
policy remained as yet unanswered. Bu.t Congress was precluded from ig-
noring the Indian situation for too long; the future of the national 
gover:nment was, in many ways, tied to the westo Most Congressmen knew 
that w~stern settlements were inevitable, and they saw this trend as the 
one bright spot in a dim futureo If Congress could establish its authori-
ty over the western territory -- especially the Old Northwest== it could 
profit from land sales and so avert the speotre of financial disaster~ 
Another compelling respensibility was the granting of bounty lands in the 
west that had been promised to repay citizens for military servioeo 
The area desired had been conf'ii,ned to the Indians at the 1768 
Treaty of Fort Stanwix, and the tribe.smen were deter.mined· to maintain 
that agreement., War with the Indians was out.of the question for fi-
nancial reasons, and yet General Washington reported hostilities against 
the red men that would surely precipitate such a oonf'liot if Congress did 
not aot .. 23 
With his western lands inter,sts and military e:iq,erienoe, George 
Washington was something of an authority on Indian a.ff.airs; his opinions 
would not only influence Congress, but prc.,bably fairly represent the tone 
of.that body's own thinkingo In Ma.y he noted the outbreak of hostilities 
on the Pennsylvania-Virginia frontier and e:iq,lained that the Indians would 
always be troublesome neighbors and must be removed a good distance from 
the settlers. Removal, he felt, could be aooomplished by purchase or 
23Far from denying mistreatment of the Indians, Washington suggested 
that the acts were committed with the approbation, if not the authority, 
of the states and added "I confess, my Mind revolts at the Idea or those 
Wanton Barbarities which both sides have in too many Instances been the 
unhappy Witnesses.tog" George Washington to President of Congress, April 
4, 1783, Washington Writinss, XXVI, 2840 
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conquest, althou.gh "which of the two will be adopted by Congress I know 
not. The first, I believe wou.ld be cheapest and. most consistent perhaps 
with justice, the latter most effeotual•"24 As the summer passed and 
Congress took no definite steps, he put down his thoughts on the Indian 
situation in a long letter to James Duaneo25 He supported any policy 
that would allow the government to take speedy 00mma.nd or the west; it 
was foolish, he said, to allow "land jobbers, speculators and mono-
polisers", or even scattered settlers, to take p<!>ssession of the lando 
This would cause Indian war and secure the speculators everything and the 
government nothingo He suggested that a just policy would be to (l) re-
quire return of' all prisoners of every age and sex (2) inform the Indians 
that the British, in the provisional peace treaty, had ceded a.11 lands to 
the United States (3) hold out the Indian hostility during the war as a 
just reason to require them to move beyond tllte Lakeso Having established 
their claims, the United State~ could then generously waive so harsh a 
punishment; rather they should redraw the 1768. boundary line to acquire 
needed territory and agree that neither Indian or white should cross into 
the other9 s lands exoept for trading, treating or exceptional eauseo He 
advised the gover:rment not to try to grasp too much or too little by suoh 
a lineo When established, he suggested it be made a felony f0r anyone to 
settle or survey Indian lands,, Any Indian a.gents-= the Genera1 was evi.= 
dently unimpressed by the Continental commissioners -- should have only 
limited duties and these accurately definedo Finally, he urged purchase 
of needed lands as a last resort; war was to be strictly avoidedo "In a 
24George Washington to Chevalier De Cha.stellus, May 10, 1783, ibido, 
419~ 
· 
25George Washington to Jam.es Duane, September 7, 1783, ibido, XXVII, 
133-1400' 
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word, there is nothing to be obtained by an Indian War bat th.e Soil they 
live on and this can be had by purchase at less expense and witheu-t the 
bloodshed and those distresses which ~elpless Women and Children are made 
partakers in all kinds of disputes with them. n26 
In October Congress finally began f~eling its way toward a poliey., 
The Congress accepted a committee report27 that began with the premise 
that the western lands must be opened. The report listed several com-
pelling reasons for this policy: pledges of bounty lands to the ar.my must 
be hone.red, the obvious increase in domes~ic population and immigrant ar ... 
rivals, the justified belief' of public creditors that the west would l?e 
improved into a tu.nd for security and payment of the national debt all 
demanded such a. policy .. 28 The lands could be obtained in three ways, 
Indian war, purchase, or voluntary cessions by the Indians .. The alterna-
tive of war was discarded. Repeated victories might drive the In.dians 
from part of their lands, but these could only be settled with the pro-
teotion of an expensive establishme~t of troops and garrisons .. Even if 
the Indians could be completely driven 0ut of the Ohio 00untry, this 
course was to be avoided for they would repair to Canada and, nursing 
their resentment, deny any part o:f the fur trade to the Amerieans. 29 The 
most likely alternative was pu.rohase, but it was ruled out because "the 
public finances do not admit or any considerable expenditure to extinguish 
26Ibido, l4qo 
27The committee that composed this report consisted or James Duane, 
Richard Peters, Daniel Carroll, Benjamin Hawkins, and .Ai-thur Lee .. J 0 C .. C .. , 
XXV, 6800 The report covered only the Northern and Middle Departznents, -
since information regarding the Southern Department was lacking .. Even-
tually it was applied to that Department alsoo 
28Ibid., 682-683. 
29Ibido, 681-682,. 
the Indian claims upon such lands. "JO The oril.y solu.tion was to draw 
boundary lines that would include tree cessions. 
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An unanswered question was why the Indians should be will:l.ng to make 
these gifts of land. Largely, the report suggests, because they joined 
the wrong side in the waro Their depredations and General SUllivan•s 
campaign constituted expenses that the victors now had a right to recoup. 
Explicitly they reasoned: 
A bare reoolleotic:>n of the f'acts is sufficient to ma:nif est 
the obligation they Lthe Indian!]" are under to make atone-
ment for the eno:t"lllities which they have perpetuated, and a 
reasonable compensation for the expenses which the United 
States have incurred by their wanton barbarities, and they 
possess no other means to do this act of :lustioe ·than by a 
compliance with the proposed boundaries.31 . 
Congress accepted this report and the general policy behind ito The 
Iroquois and western tribes would be required to surrender all lands be ... 
tween.the Ohio and Lake Erie east of the Great Miami and Maumee rivers.32 
For economy, they suggesteq that this be accomplished at one general con-
ference and provided that the Oneida and Tuscarora were to be secured in 
their lands as a reward for their fidelity during the war.33 Further, 
Abraham Clark, Daniel Carroll and John Montgomery were chosen to draw up 
'.34 
a plan of trade regulations.. A potential trap was plaeed in the way of 
the newly announced policy by providing that "the preceding measures of 
Congressrela.tive to Indian affairs, shall not be construed to affect the 
territorial claims c:,f any of the States or their legislative :right within 
30Ibid.,, 682., 
31Ibid .. , 683 .. 
32Ibid.,, 686 .. 
3:3 Ibido, 687., 
34Ibid.,, 693 .. 
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their respective 11mits.n35 A mischievous provision, this was one that 
provincdalism demanded. Nothing at this U.e was done aboat the com-
mittee•s disclaimer that they did "not offer the measures ••• as a 
sufficient security against the increase or feeble, disorderly, and dis-
persed settlements ••• against the depravity of' manners which they have 
a tendency to produce .... or against the elamities of frequent and d$-
struotive wars with the Indians ..... and that in their opinion nothing 
can avert those complicated and impending mischiefs ...... but the speedy 
establi•ent of' government ••• in such districts .. "36 
This was a harsh policy; some 3,000,000 acres of land were to be re-
quired or the Indians .. One scholar asserts "for imperial aggressiveness 
and outright effrontery this document takes a f'r0nt rank in the annals 0£ 
American expansion.n37 It seems hard to imagine, however, exactly what 
alternative Congress could have taken. ~stern lands were to be settled, 
with or without Congressional approval, by implacable settlers .. The lands 
were the o:nly ready hope of tilling the national treasury, a vital demand .. 
Payment for the lands was simply out of the question .. Congress was not 
being economical when it demanded f'ree cessions, it was recognizing the 
stern. real.ity that the depressed state of the Continental Treasury fore= 
closed a:n.y expenditure for land purchases. 
Even in the :realm of theory, igno,:-ing practicalities, Congressmen 
likely found no difficulties in supporting their policy.. Years later, 
so stern a Puritan as John Qa.1:noy Adams spoke tor them when he answered 
the "moralists" who questioned the right of white men to replace the 
. 35Ibid. 
36Ibido, 693-694. 
37Dow.nes, 284 .. 
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Indians so 'brllsquely)8 "Bllt have they maturely considered the whole 
subject?" he as.ked. "What is the right 0£ the huntsman to a forest or 
a thnsand miles over which he has accidentally ranged in quest or prey? 
• o • Shall the lordly savage not only disdai!l the virtues and enjoyment 
ot civilization himself, but shall he control the oivilization or a. 
world? Shall he forbid the wilderness to blossom like the rose?" Con-
tinuing in this line, he conol-a.ded, "No, generous philanthropists! Heaven 
has not thus placed at irreconcUable strife its moral laws with its 
physical creation." This sort 0£ pre-Mam.test Destiny theory was widely 
held. Mro Chief Justice .Ma.r$hall later wrote it into law, ho~ding that 
Indian lands had been absolutely vested in the British' crown, and this 
title transferred to the United States in 1783.39 This absolute title, 
he explained, was encu;m.bered with a right 0£ occupancy and usutruct on 
the pa.rt or the Indians, wt theirs was not a vested right .. A realist, 
the Chief Justice held that Indians were not subject to usual rules or 
law or morals. Dif'rerences ot civilization made it impossible to as-
similate them into society or to ,govern them; peaoetal. joint occupancy 
was likewise impossible. Civilization, then, demanded that the Indians 
be denied any but temporary title, revocable at will by the conquerero 
On March 4, 1784 Congress elected George Rogers Clark, Oliver 
Wolcott, Nathaniel Green, Richa~ Bu.tler and Stephen Higgenson as oom ... 
missioners to hold eonterenoes with the tribeso'+O On the next day Congress 
JBJobn Qu.inoy Ada.ms to Sons ot the Pilgrims, December 22, 1802, 
quoted in Charles Co Royoe, "Indian Land .. Cessions in the U:nited States," 
18th Annual Report of the Ba.reau of American Ethnology (Wa:shingtonc 
Government Printing Of'tioe, 1899)-;-5315-537.. 1 • 
39Johnson !!!! Graham's Lessee!." M'Intosh, 8 Wneaton 543 (1823)0 
40 . i..• .Q. o .Q.. , XXVI, 124. 
directed the President to order the oQlDJJlissioners to be about their 
business as quiolcly as poss:l.ble; in addition, all CoJ11gressiou.l. c•-
missions as Indian agents dated before March 4 were revoked.41 The 
business of collecting supplies needed for a treaty ~nd persuadi:ng the 
tardy Indians to asseml;>le was not to be hurried, however, and it was 
October before commissioners Wolcott, Blltler and Lee met the Six Nation.~ 
at Fort Stanw1x.42 The treaty, co~luded October 22, was l?rief: (l) the· 
United States granted peace to the Iroquois confederacy and took them 
under her sovereignty (2) hostages were required for the return ot all 
prisoners (3) the Iroquois were to.reed to S11rrender their historic claim 
to all lands west of Virginia and Pennsylvania.43 The Indians had hopeq 
to maintain the 1768 line, but the Amer:1,.oa.ns were relentless.. "You. are· 
a subdued people o ••• When we ofter you peace on moderate terms, we 
do it in magnanimity and mercy. It you do not accept it now, you are not 
to expect a repetition ot such offers •••• We shall now, therefore, 
declare to you the condition, on which alone you can be received into the 
peace and protection ot the United States."44 The Iroquois had littl.e 
choice but to agree, discontented thngh they were. As soon as the 
federal commissioners were finished, commissioners fr0m Pennsylvania and, 
. 
Virginia took over. Pe!U,lsylvama secured every acre of Iroquois land 
41 Ibid .. , 125 .. 
42 All trea,ties between the Continental Congress and the Indian . 
nations_oan b.e-tn.nd, arranged by date, in Richard Peters (ed .. ), Pablio: 
Statutes !!. Large, VII. · 
. 43This treaty spelled the end of the imperial rule of the .Iroquois •. 
Many of the confederaoymoved to Canada, the others were eventually 
forced onto reservations .. The unity ot the Confederation was completely 
broken du;-ing_the Revolution. 
44nownes, 291. 
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within the bounds or that state. 45 New York was not so ambitions, but 
State Commissioners did secure the first or a series or t~eaties that 
constantly nibbled at Iroquois holdingsiW;Lthin New York boundaries.46 
By December )0, oemmissioners Lee, Blltler and Clark had repaired to 
Fort Mcintosh to deal with the Wyandotte, Delaware, Ottawa and Chippewa. 
nationso In a repetition of Fort Stanwix, the commissioners insisted t~e 
western nations cede all lands except a reservation bounded by the 
Cuyahoga, Maumee and Lake Erie, and on the south bya line drawn throug4 
the central part of' what is today Ohio. The Indians protested their los~ 
I 
or land, "but the Commissioners have answered them in a high tone; the 
l?utrport of which was, that as they had adhered during the war to the K1ng 
of Great Britain, they were considered by us as a conquered people, and 
had therefore nothing to expect from the United States, but must depend 
altogether upon their Lenity and Generosity~ This spirited answer it is 
supposed will have the Desired erreet. 1147 On January 2lt 1785, the treaty 
was signed., 
The third and final treaty in this series was to come from a eon ... 
f'erence held with the. Shawnee; 'Miami, Wea, Pianka.shaw, Potawatomi and 
K1ckapoo at Vincennes. Gathering discontent among the tribes over stan~ 
wix and Mcintosh caused delay. When, in January, 1786, t~e conference 
was held, the site was changed to Fort Finney at the mou.th of the Great 
Miami, and it was attended by only a few Shawnee who had been coerced 
45commissioners for Treating with the Indians to President Dickin-
son, November 15, 1784, ,lo A·, X, 360. 
46.All of these, ,state, treati.es and .. thei.r.prooeedings .. are.in. Franklin 
~ Hough . ( ed. ) , Proeeedings, 2£. ~ Commissioners e! Indian A.fl'airs. !£= 
Rbinted-!?z.law !2.£ the Exti;!fshment ,2! Indian titles !!! !.h!. State .2£ l!!\! ~ (ilbany: Joel Munse . , 1861), 2 volso 
47colo Josiah Harmar to President Dickinson, January 15, 1785, lo !Q, · 
x, 395. 
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there by threat of war. The purpose of the treaty was to secure a ratifi-
cation of the previous treaties by the western tribes. The Shawnee re-
fused to sign until Richard Bu.tJ.er told them, "the destruction of your 
women and children or their future happiness, depends on your present 
choice" Peace or war is in your powero o o o ,,48 
The Indians prepared to challenge Cengressiona.1 policyo In 1783 
they had been confused and dividedo The warriors had been fighting a 
frontier war and had appeared to be slowly winning, when suddenly their 
loyal British allies told them that they must accept pea.Ceo The British 
had no intention of loosening their hold on the tribes, but they did ac~ 
i 
cept the peace to the extent of refusing officially to support further 
Indian h<l>stilities., Then ca.me the harsh treaties of 1784-1785., The 
Indian answer, <l>rd.ginating with Sir John Johnson and Joseph Brant, was a 
general confederacy of the Six Nations and the western tribes to present 
a u.rdfied front t<l> the demands of the 4,:merieanso49 
In July, 1784, the Six Nations sent a call to all the western nations 
to meet with them on the Sandusky in the fall to form a general confeder= 
acy}O This was the first of a series of confederaey meetings that led 
to the Indian War of 1790-17940 Meeting in September, the tribes agreed 
that land cessions would be made only by the general confederacy and that 
they would hold the Ohio as their boundary~5l Hearing rumors of this 
48nownes~ 207. 
49February 2, 1784, Ephraim Douglass reported that Sir Jahn Johnson 
was giving the Indians "presents with lavish profussion" and telling the?Jl 
that the King had not oeded any of their lands~ He told them to put down 
their tomawhaks, but.not t<!> lay them far from sight since they might need· 
them so<m to protect their .la>;1ds o Ephraim Douglass to President Dickin-
son, .February 2, 1784, .f. !·, X, 554-555 .. 
.50Downes, 282 .. 
51Ibido, 284., 
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eoni'ederaoy, Congress had changed their instructions to hold one large 
meeting to an order to treat with every nation separately and at a 
different time and plaoe: this could "discourage every coalition and 
consultationtt52 among the tribes. In December, 1786 the Confederacy me} 
at Detroit and drafted a message to Congress. The Indians stated their 
disappointment in not being included, in the treaty with Britaino Never'!" 
theless, they expressed a desire for! peaeeo This peace could best be 
maintained, they insisted, by carrying out all negotiations in the voice 
of the general confederacy. Even more pointedly they added, "especially 
as landed matters are often the. subjeot of our councils with you, a matter 
of greatest importance and general concern to us, in this ease we hold :i,t 
indispensably necessary that any cessions of our lands should be made in 
the most public manner, and by the united voice or the confederacy; hald-
ing all partial treaUes as void and or no ef'fect.tt53 This amounted to 
a camplete repudiation of the cession treaties and an Indian call for a 
new conference to redraw the boundaries. The message was signed by the 
Six Nations, Hu.ron, ottawa, Twi.ehtwee, Shawnee, Chippewa, Cherokee, Del~ ... 
ware, Potawatomi and the Wabash confederates .. 
'Dle demand was, 0f course, impossible to meet. Obviously the Indian 
confederacy wanted to redraw the boundary to reclaim their lost landso By 
Maroh 1, 1784 Congress had accepted the Virginia oession of' western lan(\i~ 
that completed title to the Old Northwest. In May, 1785 Congress passe4, 
an Ordinance that provided for surveying and disposing of' these lands f'(?r 
the benefit of the national government. The Seven Ranges were almost 
52 · 
.\!..• £• £., XXVI, 153. 
53walter Lowrie and Matthew st. Clair Clark (eds .. ), American State 
Papers, Indian Affairs (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), I, 8-90 
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surveyed, and the area was alJ."eady filling with settlers.54 When the de-
manded meeting was finally held at Fort ~r,in Jamary, 1789, the 
Indian hope was futile; bad ~ey been able to negotiate a new boundary, 
which is unlikely, they oc,uld not have reve~sed the tide of settlers who 
held the Indian lands beyond all hope of' recovery .. 
Activities in the·southern states were similar to those in the 
northern area. On May 27, 1784, Richard Beresford, Thomas Jefferson, 
Jeremiah Townley Chase, Richard Dobbs Spa.ight and Jacob Reed reported to 
Congress on conditions there.55 They suggested the provisions for the 
. northern department shottld be followed; again the~e ·could be no land 
purchases since "Congress, however desirous they may be to gratify their 
better feelings in acts of humanity, will not be warranted in advancing 
beyond the essential interests of their constituents .. ,,56 Again the com-
missioners were to draw bounQary lines, although the lines were not so 
important in the south, where Congress controlled little public landso 
It was agreed that South Carolina would be called on to bear the expenses 
of the southern treaties -- she could deduct this amount from her yearly 
quota~- but Congress gloomily provided that if the state should refuse, 
54Th.e problem or state cessions or western lands is care:f'ully e:x:=. 
a.mined in Merrill Jensen, "The Creation of the National Domain, 1781= 
1784," Mississippi VallethHistorieal Re,er,, XXVI (December, 1929), 323= 
342 and "The Cession of e Oi.d North.was, Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, XXIII (June, 1936), 27-48. Congressional government of the Old 
Northwest is reviewedinTheoc;lore q .. Pease, "The Ordinance of 1787," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review,. XXV (September, 1938), 167 ... 180; 
Beverley Bond, .. Jr .. ,.· "An 'American Experiment in Colonial Government," 
Mississi~pi Valley Historical Review, XV (September, 1928), 221-235; 
Freder:lc~Jacks,on:.Tu.rne~, !'Western State Ma.king in the Revolutionary 
Era," .American Historical Review, I (October, 1895 and Januaey, 1896), 
Part I: 70 ... a,, Part II: 251-269 .. 
55J. 0.,. c .. , XXVII, 4530 · 
- --- . 
56 
' Ibid .. , 4550 
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the Continental Treasury would provide the tunds.57 
Before Congress could activate this report by appointing commissioners, 
chronic absenteeism caused a recess that lasted .from June to October. The 
Committee of the States sat, but it was powerless., When Governor Martin 
of South Carolina wrote to inquire about southern eol1lll1issioners, the Com-
mittee could only reply "the whole of this business must. o o wait the 
decision of Congress at their next meeting. 11.58 Finally, on March 21, 1785 
Benjamin Hawkins, Daniel Ga.rroll, William Peery,59 Andrew Pickens and 
60 ·• · Joseph Martin were eleetedo Most of the southern states possessed ex-
tensive frontier lands, and they dreaded national interference that might 
limit their exploitation of the Indianso Richard Spaight reported that 
in selecting commissioners Hawkins was elected first; the other states 
mistrusted this Georgia delegate and added Carroll of Maryland and Peery 
of Delaware to cheek him. "This of course gave very great dissatisfaction 
to the southern states," whereupon Pickens and ~rtin were added to 
balance the delegation again.61 
Am.id the clutter o.f state treaties, local jealousy and Spanish in= 
trigue, the southern. commissioners worked. They met first with the Ohero= 
kee at Hopewell, coneluding the treaty on November 28, 17850 Following 
the familiar pattern, the treaty provided .for restoration of prisoners, 
an acknowledgement by the trib~ that it was under United States sovereign-
ty, and drawing o.f a boundary lineo 
.57Ibid .. , 460. 
58 6 
. Ibid.' 59 0 
59Ibido~ XXVIII, 83. 
60Ibia .. , 840 
Further, it was agreed that.any white 
' 
61R:tehu>d Dobbs Spaight to Wl.lliam mount, March 27, 178.5, Lo Co ,g_.,, 
nn,~o --
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who settled on Indian lands and remained for six months would forfeit 
government protection and be subject to Indian punishment. Indians com-
mitting crimes were to be delivered te .United States officials for punish~ 
ment, as were any whites apprehended in a crime against an India.no Final-
ly, it was agreed that the United States would regulate al]. trade with 
the Indians, and the treaty ended with a mutual pledge of perpetual peaoeo 
As soon as the Cherokee departed, almost identical treaties W$re concluded 
at the same place with the Choctaw on January 3, 1786 and the Chickasaw on 
January lOo No treaty was concluded with the C?'eeks whc, under the in"" 
flue:nce of the Spanish and their chief Alexander McGillivray, refused to 
meet with the Commi.ssionerso Indeed, far from co;nferring, they appeared 
to be on the brink of attacking Georgia. 
The round of treaties was now completedo The agreements had served 
the purpose of securing the lands Congress desired, bllt drawing boundary 
lines had not brOllght the promised peacee North and south, the Indians 
were discontented at their loss of land. Fereign elements - the B~ tish 
from their northwest posts and the Spanish operating out of Florida=-
helped sustain the hostilityo 0n Ma.y 17, 1786, Congress noted completion 
of the treaties and revoked all commissions as Indian agents preparatory 
to a "proper organization of the I;ndiandepa.rtmento"62 Congress had been 
w:ithOllt any permanent agents fol," two yea.rs now, and they were badly neededo 
On May 14, Henry Knox, the new Secretary of War, told Congress that hos-
tilities "on the. wa. ters of the Ohio" seemed "inevitable .. 1163 Southern con= 
gressm.enwere preparing to demand 400 Continental soldiers to put an e:r;i.d 
64 to Shawnee and Cherokee attacks on Kentuokyo A permanent department was 
62l· Q .. . .9. .. ' xxx, 2860 
63Ibido, 3430 
64talliam Grayson to James Monroe, May 28, 1786, ~ .. Q .. Qo, VIII, 3750 
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al'S_<!> .needed to lend a contirmity to Indian affairs that the weakened 
Congress could not pr(l)vide. In the same month that, all C(l)mmissions were 
revoked, Congressman:, James Manning reported to his·state "this is our de-
plorable.Situation ad.JJ~ngr.ess.<,bliged this day ~o adjourn £or want of 
a sufficient number of States to proceed in the necessary and most im-
portant business ot the Conf'ederacy.n65 
On June 28, Charles Pinckney, James MoJ.!ll"Oe and Rltfus King reportedo66 
Following the traditional division or three departments, they provided .for 
each a professional :full-time superintendent who would reside on the fron-
tier. He would appoint deputi&s and was ordered to license all traders, 
who were required to provide bond f<!>r good behaviC!>re The traders would 
be restricted to a pemenant post, which was specified on their license, 
SQ they could not roam among the tribes; neither could they sell liquor 
tC!> the Indianso The superintendent had pewer to arrest anyone violating 
the Qrdinancee Finally the superintendent was to report to and be :re-
sponsible to Congress. Congress did not take the report up agai~ until 
July 20, when a southern amendment was defeated which aimed· at limiting 
the superintendent's power to negotiate w;tth the tribes in favor of the 
67 stateso The next day Georgia delegates attempted .to delete the su.per-
intendent's power to grant licenses td traders; again they were deteatedo68 
On July 24, consideration resumed, and the southern delegates managed tc:> 
tack on a disclaimer that "provided that the legislative right of any 
·65James Manning to Governor of Rh0de Island (John Collins), May 26, 
1786, ibide t '.366. · .. 
66J c ·c·· xxx 
. ...;.• -·. -·' ' 
67Ibido, 4190 
68 Ibid., 421. 
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state within its own llmits be not infringed or violated.n69 It was also 
decided to pit the department under the Secretary of War, as it had been 
be£ore.70 A new clause was added forb:i,dding superintendents to engage, 
directly or indirectly, in the Indian trade, and they were to be re~uired 
to give bond for the faithf'u.l discharge of their dutieso71 
As a la.st-ditch eff'art to keep the Congress out of southern affairs, 
the Georgia delegates moved on August 2 to postpone so much of the ordi= 
na.nce as might apply to sou:thern Indians, bu.t this motion was defeated,, 
Three days later the .ordinance was finally passedo 72 The final document 
provided for two departments, northern and southern, with the Ohio river 
as the dividing line. Each would be headed by one, superintendent serving 
a two year termo Traders were not only to procure a. $50 license from the 
superintendent, but they were to receive this only on presenting a certi-
ficate of good character from the chief executive of their respective 
states, and payment or a $3000 bond~73 
This was the final policy decision, and perhaps the most important 
Indian legislation, of the Confederation period,. The Indian Department 
again greatly resembled the imperial British pa.tterno The familiar di-
vision of two departments, ea.oh under a single superintendent, had been 
restoredo As the British superintendents were under the authority of the 
royal military commander, so the American superintendents were under the 
chief' military official of' the oonf'ederationo A significant change was 
69Ibido, 4240 
70ibid .. , 4260 
71Ib;do, _DC!,, 4§5.,. 
72The entire Ordinance is found in ibid .. , 490..i493 .. 
73Ibid .. , 492 .. 
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the increased aontrQl over traders, but this advantage was neutralized 
in part by the jealousy of the states. Om. August 14, 1786, Richard 
.. 74 
ButJ.er was chosen northern f$Uperintendent, and on October 16 James White 
was selected for the southern department. 75 
Only one month a.:f"ter the Indian Ordinance was passed, the call was 
issued for the Consti.tutio:nal Convention; the Continental Congress was 
now. limping along on borrowed time. Yet these were crucial .mon~s., ,:he 
involuntary cessions, the efforts to form a confederacy among the Indians, 
and settler encroachments brought the Indian discontent to a high point 
in 17860 Secretary at war Knox clearly saw the hopelessness or rinding 
a just solution that would aoeollllllodate both Indian and settler when he 
reperted to Congress: 
Bu.t your Secretary apprehends that the deep rooted pre. 
judices and malignity or heartt and conduct reciprocally 
entertained and practiced on all occasions by the Whites 
and Savages will ever prevent their being good neighbors • 
. The one side anxiously def end their lands which the other 
avariciously claim. With minds previously inflamed the 
slightest offense occasions death, revenge follows which 
knows no bounds. The flames of a merciless war a.re thus 
lighted up which involve the innocent and helpless with 
the gu.ilty .. Either one or the other party must remove 
to a greater distance or Government must keep them both 
in awe by El st:rong hand and compel them to be mod$rate 
and just.76 
In late October, 1786, Congress had reports that the tribesmen were 
massing in the Shawnee towns to continue attacks on Kentuckyo Troops to 
the number of 1,340 were raised to fight the Indians,77 or so Congress 
74Ibid O ' 517. 
75Ibid., 747 •• White proved an inetf'eetual superintendento He re-
signed in 1788 to enter into land speculation and was replaced on Febr11ary 
29 ,, _ 1788, by Richard Winne. 
76Ibid.·; XXXII, 328. 
77Ibid .. , XXXI, 891-892. 
said. In tact t.he~e troops were .raised te combat potential civil in-
surrection as the news of Shays' Rebel.lion reached. Pbil.adelphia. 78 
81 
The last years of the "United states in Congress Assembled" were 
dogged by continuing IJ!ldian treubles. Attacks on Kentucky', Pennsylvania, 
and Virginia continued, althou.gh no :f'ull scale war was mountedo In July, 
1787, Secretary Knox reported that Qnl,y 500 troops were on duty on the 
Ohio frontier, and one-third of' them were occupied guarding government 
surveyors.79 If he had only 1,500 men, the Secretary thought he could 
establish a chain of posts and solve the problem, "but however dignified 
and important to the character and interests of the United States such a 
body of troops might be, it is to be regretted that the depressed state 
of finances will not admit of the measure • ..SO At all costs, he said, he 
war 
must avoid an Indian~ since "the present embarrassed state of public af-
fairs and entire deficiency of fu.nds"81 made the idea of financing opera-
tions "intolerable.• He suggested holding further conferences with the 
Indians to inquire into their grievance;; this was the only alternative 
open.82 
'78:eaids (!)fl th$ Virginia :frontier and Kentucky became regular during 
1786. Since Co~gress could promise no dependable relief, the frontiersmen 
took affairs into their own hands. Altgust 2, 1786 the frontier .militia 
officers met at Harrodsburg and voted an expedition against the northwest 
.Indians. Chosen leader, George Rogers Clark led a large frontier force 
in the auttmm of 1786 intc!> the Ohio Coµ.ntey., Past Vincennes the Indians. 
began to mas, to do battle, and the militia refused to go any tu.rthero 
Failure of discipline of militia, 'breakdown of su.pply lines, and lack of 
Confederation aid f'o:reed the exped:iUon to turn back without significantly 
punishing the tribes., For details of the expedition. see,·L. Co Heldemann, 
!!The...Borthwest~.Expeditiqn of George Rogers Clark, 1786-1787," MississiPJ!i 
Vallez Histol"ieal Review, XXV (December, 1938), 317 ... ,334,. 
79i• _g., . .Q .. , XXXII, 328. 
SOibido, 3290 
81Ibid .. , 3310 
82In July Secretary Knox a1so saw inevitable war between Georgia and 
the Creek nation .. In this ease the national government was completely 
82 
· On October 26, 1787, Congress determined to attempt. a new series of 
treaties. In the Southern Department, the s~ates of North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Georgia were eaoh to appoint a commissioner to act 
with the snperintendent .. 8'.3 These oomissioners were clearly told "the 
present Treaty having for .its principal.object the.restor~tion or peace, 
no Cession·or land is to be demanded.of the Indian.tribes."84 In the 
Northem Department. the governor of the Northwest Territor.v85 was to 
.hQld a oonferenee. in conjunction with the · superintendent; again, . "the 
primary objects of the Treaty are ·~e r~oving of all causes for co .. tro ... 
versy. o • 0"86 Still, the governor was told not to surrender an acre 
. . . . - -
that had been'obtained at Stanw:tx and Mcintosh, and he was to use "every 
exel"tion .... to defeat all confederation$' and combinations of the 
tribes .. e • .. n87 
The obvic,u.s grievance or the tribes was 'pointecl ou.t by Secretary 
Knox, who told Congress "the said tribes of ·Indians have expressed t~e 
high.est. disgust, at the principle c,f conquest, which-has been specified 
to them as the basis c,f their treaties with tl}.e United States .. o o .... ae 
He urged Congress to otter to pttrohase the lands, and offered a three-year 
helpless, .fer those Indians lived within the state•s boundaries and arr:, 
Congressiobl actio?,1 would constitute infringing the legislative right 
of the stateo · Ibido, .,IX.XIII, 7070 
S3Ibido, 7080 
84 Ibido, 7100 
8 . . . 
· 5Arthur st. · Clair was appointed Governor of the Northwest' Terri toey 
on October 5, 1787. · 
86 Ibid., 7110 
87Ibido, 712 .. 
88Ibid., XXIV, 125. 
' 
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installment plan.89 However, this was not the whC!>le or the Indian 
grievances. The fundamental problem of the red men was not money but the 
loss or their hC!>meland to a more power:t"ul society. The Continental 
Congress possessed neither the wealth nor the administrative ability to 
assimilate the tribes into a s0ciety that did not welcome them., The 
Indians hoped for the Ohio as a permanent boundaryo In this vain hope 
they were encouraged by the British, who were eager to maintain a menopoly 
on the fur trade and favored an Indian barrier state to accomplish this 
endo No answer to the problem seemed to exist. 
., 
. The next month after the secretary's report, the ninth state rati-
fied the federal Constitution; all that was expected of the Continental 
Congress was to hold together until it could be superseded.· On August 20, 
1788, Mr.,. Joseph Martin was app~inted an agent in the Southern Department 
to work with the C~eek and Cherokee 090 This was the last action taken by 
the Continental Congress on Indian affairs., On October 2, 1788 George 
Thatcher reported that their meeting place was being remodeled for the 
new Congress "and the workmen made such a continual noise that it was im= 
possible to hear one another speak,.n9l The few members present moved to 
John Jay's old office to meeto After October 13, there were never enough 
members present to eonsti tu.te a quqrum, and the old Congress died totally 
lacking the dignity that had attended its birth .. 
Their Indian policy, however, did not die., The polic;:y, SeQretar;y-·at 
War Knox, and the Indian Ordinanee of 1786 were taken over in toto into 
' --
the n~w government .. Nor were the latter any more successful in making it 
worko Washington's administration also drew boundary lines and tried to 
89Ibid., 126. 
90Ibido, 4J)o 
91George Thatcher to Nathan Dane, October 2, 1788, 1o Q. Q .. , VIIIj 802., 
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keep the two enemies part, bu.tit ceuld not be done. If the westward 
movement had come to an.end, separation might have been a reasenable so-
lution, bat th.e Americu settler had another hundred years ot expansion 
before him, and a s'lll"Veyed boundary meant nothing to the trentiersmano 
Frem 1790 to 1794 the northern confederacy made its last stand, but 
General Anthony Wayne and the Trea.ty ot Gre~nville broke thea. Sadly 
they acknowledged that the Old Northwest and Kentucky were lost to them 
forever, and they 'began the long trek-to C&nada and beyond the Missis-
sippi. 
CHAPTER VI 
1775-1788: A REVIEW 
Nothing has eJC;Cited more admiration in the world than 
the manner in which tree governments have been established 
in America; tor it was the first instance from the ore-· 
ation of the world ••• that free inhabitants have been 
seen deliberating on a form of government, and selecting 
••• thei.r citizens ••• to determine upon and give ef-
fect to it. 
James Madison1 
Americans of' the Revolutionary generation did think of themselves as 
something "new" in the world; as men of the Enlightenment, they had an 
optimism about and a confidence in their actions that men of' the twentieth 
century might envy. Yet if their Indian policy were the sole criterion, 
this self-assessment would appear to be wrong. 
No important innovation~ marked the Congressional control of' Indian 
affairs. Indeed, the longer Congress worked with Indian affairs, the 
closer it came to an exact copy of the British superintendenoi~s. The 
Ordinance of 1786 differed in little: more than degree from the British 
system as it e:x:i.sted in 1763. And yet at no time was Congress able to 
administer their program as success:fully as had Britain. Daring the war, 
Congress was able to secure only negligible aid from the Indians; rather, 
the tribes almost unanimously took an active part against the American 
cause. In time of peace, Congr~ss wa.s unable to cQntrol settl;er or Indian, 
and the wa.r of 1790-1794 was the-inevitable result of having a government 
too weak to restrain either side. Armed force seemed the only agent that 
l . Quoted.in Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Co:mmager, The Growth 
~~American Republia (New ·York: Oxford University Press, J,,942 ), I, 23! .. 
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could fill the vacu'\l111 that Congress produced. 
At the same time, these were years of transition :for the Indians. 
The events of the Revolution made apparent a long term trend, the dis-
integration of the Iroquois Confederacy. The unanimity that had made the 
Confederacy the overl~rd of the northeastern United States was broken, 
and the humiliating Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1785 dispe~ed any hope for 
continued hegemony over the western tribes of the Ohio regiono With the 
restraining hand of the Iroquois lifted, the~e tribes -- esPi9aially the 
Shawnee, Mingo and Delaware,.._ moved towards war. The western tribes 
lacked the knowledge of state. oraft and the sophisticated understanding 
of what was happening between the Indian and the red man that the Iro-
quois possessed. By the end of the Federalist Era, all Indians east of 
the Mississippi were in the, process of being disposse:rned.. Some, like 
many Iroquois, moved to Canadao Others crossed the Mississippi and at~ 
tempted to accommodate themselves to a new kind of life, one dominated by 
the horse and the hunt, This displacement was a process made inevitable 
by the policies of the Continental Congress. Unimaginative and inept 
administration left the Congressmen no alternative but to bow to the ex~ 
pediency of force. 
The humanitarian record of the Congress provides no alternative to 
this mediocre pictureo After the war Congr~ss made no effort to provide 
missionaries or teachers to prepare the tribes for assimilationo .Among 
the Six Nations and the Cherokee significant work might have been done to 
assist the Indians to live with the white men. These were a. people alre,ady 
acquainted with agricultural skills and sedentary living, and they already 
possessed a fail"ly complex government. But Congress sent no instructions 
to the superintendents to educate their charges; rather they were to bend 
all efforts to keep Indians and whites apart. A vast western territory 
lay open to settle and govern, and Americans were determined to do it 
d~spite, not with, the Indian. Only a few thoughtful citizens might 
agree with Secretary of W'a.r Knox when he vainly wrote: 
How different would be· the sensation of a philosophic mind 
to reflect, that, instead of exterminating a part of the 
human race by our modes of population, we had persevered, 
through all difficulties, and at last had imparted (l)Ur 
knowledge of cultivation and the arts to the aborigines 
of the country, by' which the source 0f future life and 
happiness had been preserved and extendedo But it has 
been oonc;,eived to be impraetieal to civilize the Indians 
of North America. This opinion is probably more con-
venient than justo2 
2.Amerioan State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 53G 
';c:. 
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